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The 2017 Conservative manifesto made it clear that the party intended to regulate social 
media more closely than before. Since then, the Cambridge Analytica scandal has brought 
the regulation of Facebook specifically even more sharply into the public domain. Facebook 
engages the interest of a number of different regulators. Its scale and size, and widening 
range of interests, means that, leaving aside the domain of EU regulation, UK regulators 
including Ofcom, the ICO, the Electoral Commission, the BBFC, the ASA, the CMA, and now 
the Bank of England, and advisory organisations like the Centre for Data Ethics and 
Innovation, all have a role. Law enforcement agencies are also engaged with the social 
media sector. In recent years, academic attention to the challenge of internet governance 
and regulation has been most obvious in the field of media and communications. Some 
argue that this has led to an over-emphasis on issues of content regulation which have 
skewed the debate, although following Cambridge Analytica, data issues have become more 
prominent, and finally competition issues have started to be raised. Others have argued that 
the analytical tools of economists have been insufficient to provide regulators with the 
necessary discursive capacity to address the issues raised by digital giants like Facebook. 
How do we conceptualise the regulatory environment that affects them? 
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Facebook ‘Regulation’: a process not a text 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The 2017 Conservative General Election manifesto is likely to be remembered more for its 
role in the loss of Theresa May’s Parliamentary majority over the so-called ‘death tax’ or 
‘dementia tax’ (Asthana and Elgot, 2017) than for what it had to say about online regulation. 
Nevertheless, it is worth recounting both what it had to say and the way in which it said it, 
for the manifesto took aim at what it perceived as a historic consensus against regulation of 
the ‘internet’. Within the manifesto, we can read both an attempt to establish a new 
agenda, and at the same time, the re-confirmation of a number of myths, misconceptions 
and mis-conceptualizations which continue to affect debates on the regulation of Big Tech. 
As the House of Lords Communications Committee commented in 2019, the internet is not, 
in fact, ‘a lawless “Wild West”’ (House of Lords, 2019:3), and as the UK Competition and 
Markets Authority (CMA)  says in a useful summary of relevant law, the idea that online 
services are not regulated is ‘misplaced’ (CMA, 2019b).   
In considering the regulation of Facebook as ‘a process’ rather than a text, I am seeking to 
establish that the issue with Facebook is not that it is unregulated, but that it is under-
regulated. Facebook has been regulated from the moment it became incorporated as a 
company under Delaware law in 2004 (Kirkpatrick, 2011). As Cass Sunstein points out (2017) 
Facebook users own their own Facebook accounts as they are governed by property law. 
Facebook was issued with a consent order by the FTC in 2012 in relation to privacy and data 
issues (FTC, 2012b). As a public company since 2012, it is regulated by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC, 2012). Its acquisition of Instagram in 2012 was approved by 
regulators in the United States and Europe, including the UK (FTC, 2012a; OFT, 2012).  Its 
acquisition of WhatsApp was approved by the FTC and the European Commission (FTC, 
2014; EC, 2014). It was fined by the European Commission in 2017 over breaches of 
undertakings in relation to the 2014 WhatsApp acquisition (EC, 2017). It is bound by laws 
regarding illegal content in many countries: how it implements its obligations under those 
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laws is more of a question. The Indian Telecommunications Regulatory Authority essentially 
blocked its Free Basics plans in 2015 (Bhatia, 2016). Facebook itself acknowledged that the 
E.U.’s General Data Protection Regulation had affected user numbers in Europe (Facebook, 
2018a). Belgian regulators ruled against tracking of users in 2018 (BBC, 2019a). It accepted, 
though not without litigation, a fine from the UK Information Commissioner’s Office in 2019 
(ICO, 2019d). It is currently litigating the Bundeskartellamt’s decision on the legality of its 
advertising practices in Germany (Colangelo, 2019). It has also disputed a two million euro 
fine under the German NetzDG Act (Delcker, 2019). It faces antitrust litigation from 47 US 
States (New York Governor’s Office, 2019). The Australian Government is now taking 
forward an ‘implementation roadmap’ for the Australia Consumer and Competition 
Commission’s report on the Google/Facebook advertising duopoly (Australian Government, 
2019). The Irish Data Protection Commissioner had 10 outstanding cases against Facebook 
companies at the end of 2018 (DPC, 2018; Scroxton, 2019). Litigated or regulated 
settlements litter Facebook’s history from 2004 to 2019. These examples are representative 
of many others which could be cited. Facebook has been subject to a continuing process of 
regulation over time and across different territories. A significant variety of UK regulators 
and advisory bodies have a degree of oversight or interest in Facebook’s activities (see Table 
One). The notion of a digital services tax (HM Treasury, 2018a) should also be considered an 
issue of regulation. As Faroohar argues (2019) ‘perhaps the tide has finally turned against 
Big Tech’. Indeed, as Tepper writes (2019), ‘it is hard to keep track of the investigations’.  
A further reason why we should consider the regulation of Facebook as a ‘process’ relates to 
what Barrett and Kreiss (2019) usefully conceptualise as ‘platform transience’. Facebook in 
2020 is not the Facebook of 2004 or even of 2012 or 2014. This ‘transience’ can be affected 
by normative pressure from external stakeholders such as the media, politicians, users, or 
governments. As Barrett and Kreiss say, platform transience is demonstrated through 
Facebook’s policies, procedures and affordances. It is also demonstrated through 
Facebook’s business practices (Srinavasan, 2019; Zuboff, 2019), its acquisitions (Andrews, 
2019a:4-6), its governance structure (Andrews, 2019a:17)  and its ambitions, such as its 
electronic currency plans, recently the subject of an intervention by the Governor of the 
Bank of England (Carney, 2019), and its so-called ‘privacy pivot’  involving moves towards a 
fully encrypted system for all its key social networks (Zuckerberg, 2019a), and the 
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integration of their ‘underlying technical infrastructure’ (Isaac, 2019a) now attracting 
interest from politicians, regulators and the security services (House of Commons, 2019b; 
Hern, 2019; Home Office, 2019a; Knowles and Dean, 2019).  We can also trace this in the 
development of Facebook’s own regulatory narrative, documented clearly in the University 
of Wisconsin’s Zuckerberg Files (Zuckerberg Files, nd; Hoffman et al, 2018), from a general 
emphasis on the seriousness of its internal policing practices and its external ambitions of 
making the world more open and connected (Zuckerberg, 2017) to its acceptance of the 
case for regulation (Zuckerberg, 2019) and its positioning as a U.S. national champion in the 
face of Chinese digital apps such as Tik-Tok (Facebook Newsroom, 2019; Mac, 2019). 
I will also seek to expand the notion of ‘regulation’ in this paper to include regulation of 
Facebook’s conduct by the media, public and parliamentary pressure, and by other market 
players, all of which is part of the ‘process’ of regulation. Discussion of the ‘regulation’ of 
Facebook also opens up consideration of regulation of other Big Tech companies. I follow 
the House of Lords Select Committee on Artificial Intelligence in defining ‘Big Tech’ as 
companies ‘who have built business models partially, or largely, focused on the 
“aggregation of data and provision of cloud services” ‘ (House of Lords, 2018a:45). These 
issues are related to, but separate from, consideration of the regulation of ‘the internet’, 
however we may wish to define that.  
 
I use the term ‘regulation’ rather than the term ‘governance’ popularised in the age of 
networks (for a useful account see Collins, 2009:51-9) and familiar to us from three 
particular literatures: political science (for example, Bevir and Rhodes, 2003); internet 
governance (for example, Harcourt et al, 2020; Carr, 2016) and corporate governance (for 
example, Wright et al, 2014). More recently, amongst others, Gorwa has sought to establish 
concepts of ‘platform governance; (2019a and b). My use of ‘regulation’ rather than 
‘governance’ stems not only from its common usage in political discourse, where there is a 
belief that these are to a degree different things, but also from a desire to re-establish the 
role of the (democratic) state in promoting countervailing power (Galbraith, 1952 (1963)) 
and as a site of contestation for power. Regulation is a process but it can also be a struggle 
(Pohle et al, 2016). Koop and Lodge (2017) have demonstrated that uses of the term 
‘regulation’ in academic discourse can often spill over into discussions of governance in any 
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case, including forms of self-regulation. Bartle and Vass (2007:889-91), looking inter alia at 
the communications regulator Ofcom, suggest that self-regulatory and voluntary 
approaches ‘are rarely entirely detached from the state’ and that the state itself may 
promote self-regulation via legislation, citing the 2003 Communications Act as an example. 
There is not the space here for a full consideration of the terms governance and regulation 
when it comes to platforms such as Facebook, but it is worth observing that in theoretical 
discussions around governance, corporate governance of Facebook and Google gets less 
attention than it deserves. As the Stigler Center report (2019) says, 
 
Google voting stock is controlled by two individuals, Sergey Brin and Larry Page; 
Facebook by one, Mark Zuckerberg. Thus, three individuals have total control over 
the personalized, obscure news feeds of billions of human beings. 
 
My focus is also on regulation of Facebook, rather than regulation by Facebook, though I 
recognise that platforms can and do regulate user and institutional behaviour (Napoli 2015; 
Gillespie, 2017; Caplan and boyd, 2018; Gorwa 2019a).  I regard ‘platform governance’ as 
too wide a term for manageably examining regulatory and governance issues - the issues 
raised by Uber and Airbnb may on occasion relate to similar concerns to those raised by 
Facebook, but those are likely to be captured by specific  categories of data protection and 
privacy rather than within a general concept of ‘platforms’.  In any case, there are 
differences between advertising-funded platforms and non-advertising funded platforms, as 
the CMA points out (CMA,2019a). Explicitly, I am talking about social media platforms, with 
Facebook as an exemplar. Gorwa and more recently Karpf (2019) have pointed to a 
disconnect between scholars from different disciplines in their approach to issues of 
governance and regulation in the digital sphere. I agree with this and I would argue that 
there is now a rich body of empirical research material based on parliamentary/legislative, 
regulatory, governmental and international institutional documentation which is rarely 
discussed in detail by communications scholars but which should certainly concern political 
and public administration scholarship if we are to move from the aspirational to the 
concrete in terms of regulation. All of this material suggests that the state still has ‘a unique 
set of powers and resources’ (Marinetto, 2003) and a primary role in the process of 
regulation (or governance, if you prefer).  
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I will argue in this paper that governments, regulators and law-makers, including in the UK, 
are going through a process of sense-making (Weick, 1995 and 2001) in their reflections on 
Facebook and other Big Tech companies, and that this process has intensified in the UK 
since 2017. Prior to this, the drive for regulation had principally come from within the media 
sector, and media scholars had been the most prominent in making the case within the 
academy (Iosifidis and Andrews, 2018). The predominant regulatory emphases had been on 
protection of children and on the disparity of treatment between social media companies 
and media companies on content issues. In part this resulted in the 2017 Digital Economy 
Act with its provisions on online pornography and the creation of an age-verification 
regulator (subsequently dropped - see DCMS, 2019b), and the creation of a code of practice 
for social media companies in respect of bullying and other behaviour subsequently 
published by DCMS (2019a) after consultation. Other proposals had been advanced for a 
wider regulatory framework (see, for example, Foster, 2012).   
This situational bias has now been replaced as wider considerations have grown in 
prominence, including other online harms, data security and surveillance, anti-terrorism, 
cyber-security, algorithmic accountability and competition policy issues. A range of reports 
have been produced by civil society organisations, academic institutions, parliamentary 
committees, regulators and government departments, and legislation has been passed and 
implemented in some territories. Deeper understanding has been developed of what 
individual Big Tech companies fundamentally are, and whether they pose new and different 
challenges to what has gone before. Underlying this is one fundamental question: are they 
fundamentally new kinds of entities, requiring a different kind of regulatory framework, or 
can they be regulated according to existing regulatory systems? My argument is that they 
are new entities, and their power requires a new regulatory framework, but that their 
regulation will also be integrated with existing legislative and regulatory measures. There is 
a process of regulation unfolding over time.  
 
Table One about here 
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Data, Methods, Theory 
 
This is an empirical study of developments relating to the regulation of Facebook in the UK 
in the period 2017-2020, which forms part of a larger study of Facebook as an evolving 
entity (Andrews, 2019a). This has been based on a qualitative content analysis of UK news 
coverage about Facebook and documentary analysis of the public and political reaction to a 
range of issues with political salience, including online harms of various kinds, data 
protection, advertising, elections, security, competition and regulatory proposals.  Political, 
parliamentary and regulatory documents have been analysed in an iterative process as has 
Facebook documentation, including policy statements, blogs by its chief executive, quarterly 
earnings statements, submissions to regulatory bodies, and publicly available legal 
documentation. Parallel developments in other jurisdictions - with the EU considered 
another jurisdiction in the context of Brexit - have been noted and considered where they 
may help to elucidate policy proposals in the UK, gathered from a wide range of institutional 
and media newsletters, social media and other reports. An inductive analysis has then been 
carried out of key regulatory themes and a number of regulatory battlegrounds identified 
which go beyond the issue of ‘online harms’. The key regulatory documents identified in the 
UK and considered for this work are outlined in Table Two. The key parliamentary reports 
and inquiries are outlined in Table Three. 
It is possible to separate, for convenience, Facebook regulation into broadly two kinds: 
structural, pertaining to Facebook’s significant market power (OFCOM, 2016) and its 
political power of functional sovereignty (Pasquale, 2017) which afford Facebook its 
instrumental role in relation to markets and the state; and sectoral, pertaining to 
Facebook’s consequential impacts in certain arenas such as the media, elections, public 
health and consumer protection and so on. This is simply a helpful conceptual break-down 
in order to manage the developing flood of material, and I appreciate that others may have 
different ways of ordering this. Within the structural, I include data and advertising issues 
which have opened up the space for examination of Facebook’s operations by competition 
regulators in different jurisdictions including the UK, Australia, Germany, Italy, the EU and 
the United States amongst others. I focus here on several battlegrounds: the structural - 
competition issues in respect of fair trading, data, advertising, as well as the cybersecurity 
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issue of encryption; and the sectoral -  online harms, fair elections, taxation and electronic 
currencies. Within this framework I seek to pick out emerging issues.  
I take the UK as an exemplar, but there are parallel actions in other jurisdictions. Marsden et 
al (2019) identify over 40 national laws against disinformation, for example. For the UK, 
these issues matter not least because the process of leaving the European Union raises 
significant questions of regulatory alignment and trade policy, in particular with the 
European Union and the United States. The United States has ensured that clauses on digital 
services are contained in its recent trade treaty with Canada and Mexico, which limit 
platform liability (USTR, 2019). The European Union has identified data standards as one 
difficult issue for resolution in its trade talks with the United Kingdom (Espinoza and Khan, 
2019).  Reconciling these matters may prove a challenge. Influential think-tanks in the 
United States, such as the American Enterprise institute, see European regulation, for 
example, as tariffs by other means (Lyons, 2018). 
Conceptually governments, regulators and law-makers, including in the UK, are going 
through a process of sense-making (Weick, 1995 and 2001) in their reflections on Facebook 
and other Big Tech companies as they build their discursive capacity (Andrews, 2019b) on 
these issues. Discursive capacity, which I conceptualise from the work of Schmidt (2008, 
2010, 2011) on discursive institutionalism, involves the organisational and conceptual ability 
to manage a deliberative process of problem-sensing, problem-definition and problem-
solving (Hoppe, 2011), engaging with policy actors within a specific sphere of activity. These 
policy actors may be better resourced - and this is certainly true in the field of social media - 
to shape the public policy discourse than the governments or regulators who have to 
determine the public interest. The challenge for governments, and regulators, is to identify 
and cultivate the skills necessary to address or head off emerging policy challenges: 
discursive capacity requires the ability to frame problems in terms that are capable of an 
accepted, shared and endorsed public or political consensus (Andrews, 2019b).   
 
Problems, notes Schoen (1983:40): 
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do not present themselves to the practitioners as givens. They must be constructed 
from the materials or problematic situations which are puzzling, troubling, and 
uncertain.  
This is certainly the case here. As the U.K.’s Information Commissioner has said of her 
inquiry into data analytics in elections and referendums: 
When we opened our investigation into the use of data analytics for political 
purposes in May 2017, we had little idea of what was to come. 
Eighteen months later, multiple jurisdictions are struggling to retain fundamental 
democratic principles in the face of opaque digital technologies (ICO, 2018c). 
Between 500 and 700 terabytes of data – the equivalent of over 50 billion pages – were 
recovered from the premises of Cambridge Analytica by the ICO. Dozens of servers were  
seized, as well as mobile telephones, storage devices, tablets, laptops, financial records and 
paperwork. Social media platforms, political parties, data brokers and credit reference 
agencies started to question their own processes ‘sending ripples through the big data eco-
system’. 40 ICO staff were involved, including forensic IT specialists. The Commissioner said 
this was ‘the most complex data protection investigation we have ever conducted’ (ICO, 
2018c). With many of the actors discussing the issues in public forums including 
parliamentary inquiries, the ICO had to ‘review, reconsider and rethink elements of the 
evidence previously presented.’   
Understanding these issues involves a process of ‘sense-making’.  Sense-making now has a 
significant literature, building principally though not exclusively on the work of the social 
psychologist Karl E. Weick (1995 and 2001), emphasising it as a continuing process, 
contingent, building narrative understanding through sequencing developments so that 
they can be more easily understood by the collective. It is, as Mathias (2018) describes it, in 
her examination of how civil servants in the U.K. and New Zealand reach decisions: ‘an 
active process in which people, when facing a moment of uncertainty, try to work out what’s 
going on, & then take action based on what they have sensed’.  
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Researchers have criticised ‘regulation by outrage’ (Bunting, 2018) or ‘indignation’ (Ananny 
and Gillespie) but it is part of the problem-identification and sense-making that leads law-
makers and regulators to consider questions of regulation. As Iosifidis and Andrews argue 
(2018), ‘moral panics have their uses’. Wahl-Jorgensen (2019) emphasises ‘that we need to 
take emotion seriously as a force in mediated public life’. I come in praise of shock and 
outrage as key motivators for political action: we might call this the ‘affective’ approach to 
regulation. As Papacharissi (2015:15) says, affect contributes to sense-making. Affect 
conditions the political response of politicians, just as it can drive social movements. Mark 
Zuckerberg’s non-engagement with committees of lawmakers, as with the UK House of 
Commons Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Select Committee, or the International Grand 
Committee, for example, can drive their affective reaction to Facebook as a corporation 
(Knowles, 2020b). 
Separately, competition authorities have had to make sense of a highly complex online 
advertising market and give consideration to questions of market power in a context where 
services are provided not on the basis of price but in exchange for data and attention. Coyle 
(2016) observed that economists ‘have for now left competition authorities with more 
questions than answers’ but there is now a growing pile of competition authority reports on 
digital platforms (Bundeskartellamt, 2019; ACCC, 2018 and 2019; CMA, 2019) as they 
undertake detailed analyses and gather evidence, including through public hearings (FTC, 
2019; DoJ, 2020) and recruit expert opinion (EC, 2019; Furman, 2019). Meanwhile, UK 
doctors have pointed out the difficulties of researching social media harms when the 
companies control access to the data, a further problem of information asymmetry (BBC, 
2020a). 
Weick (1995:31) carefully - and in my view helpfully - deconstructs the process of law-
making as a process of sense-making: ‘when people enact laws, they take undefined space, 
time and action and draw lines, establish categories, and coin labels that create new 
features of the environment that did not exist before’. This is perhaps never more true than 
when seeking to legislate in new and previously unexamined policy areas such as 
algorithmically-managed social media.  
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The 2017 Conservative manifesto: some problems of conceptualization 
 
The 2017 Conservative manifesto set out a bold objective on online regulation: 
 
we will take up leadership in a new arena, where concern is shared 
around the world: we will be the global leader in the regulation of the use of 
personal data and the internet. 
 
The manifesto promised that the U.K. would be ‘the safest place to be online’ and that 
online rules should reflect those that operated offline. A Conservative government would 
work ‘with industry’ to find technological solutions. They would also expect companies to 
help in the protection of minors from images of pornography, violence and other ‘age-
inappropriate’ imagery; there would be ‘a responsibility’ on industry not to direct users – 
‘even unintentionally’ to hate speech, pornography or other sources of harm; there will be a 
‘responsibility’ also ‘on platforms to enable the reporting of ‘inappropriate, bullying, 
harmful or illegal content with take-down on a comply or explain basis’. The government 
would ‘push the internet companies’ to deliver on their commitments to build tools that 
would identify and remove terrorist propaganda – and there should be no safe space or 
capability for terrorists to communicate online. 
The manifesto also promised to ensure that legitimate content creators were rewarded for 
their online content, and that there was consistency between the regulation of offline and 
online content. 
Then came a fundamental statement: 
Some people say that it is not for government to regulate when it comes to 
technology and the internet. We disagree. 
While recognising that government could not do things alone, ‘it is for government, not 
private companies, to protect the security of people and ensure the fairness of rules by 
which people and businesses abide.’ Protecting consumers from unfair behaviour, ensuring 
free markets can operate effectively, fairly and securely, was a matter for governments to 
secure, so a regulatory framework would be established in law to ensure that ‘digital 
companies, social media platforms and content providers’ abided by the rules. There would 
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be a sanctions regime for regulators to issue fines and prosecute and legal requirements on 
companies to take down offending material. There would be a levy on social media 
companies to support awareness and preventative activity to combat online harms. The 
manifesto recalled that the UK was a world leader thirty years before in regulating 
embryology, and the same could be true in the digital world.  
The manifesto recognised the need for international co-operation on many of these issues 
and said that an international legal framework was required as with financial services and 
trade. But tackling these issues could ‘demonstrate, even in the face of unprecedented 
change, the good that government can do’ (Conservative Party, 2017) 
Within this manifesto were several of the key problematic concepts which have challenged 
online regulation. Leaving aside the specific question of regulating online harms, including 
those that were not illegal, the challenges of which have been identified by several 
commentators (see, amongst others, Keller,2019;  Smith, 2020), the manifesto’s promises 
crystallized first into the Internet Safety Green Paper (DCMS, 2017) and then into the Online 
Harms White Paper (DCMS, 2019). The manifesto took aim at the consensus around 
platform liability, and what Moore and Tambini (2018) call the ‘first generation’ internet 
legislation in the UK, Europe and the United States. This includes of course Section 230 of 
the US Communications Decency Act of 1996, the EU’s E-Commerce Directive of 2000, and 
the UK’s 2003 Communications Act (Kohl, 2012). The first two limited the liability of internet 
platforms as carriers of information akin to USPs. The UK legislation created Ofcom without 
a remit for regulation of the Internet. The principles underlying S230 and the E-Commerce 
directive are now under challenge in jurisdictions around the world. 
 
The manifesto’s declaration that ‘some people say that it is not for government to regulate 
when it comes to technology and the internet’ reads as a deliberate assault on Silicon Valley 
libertarianism, famously encapsulated in John Perry Barlow’s 1996 ‘Declaration of the 
Independence of Cyberspace’ (EFF, 1996). While some would argue that national 
sovereignty in technological regulation had never seriously been under challenge (Drezner, 
2004) this Conservative manifesto statement was a specific assertion that American 
companies would not go unchallenged simply because their management, board and 
headquarters were located outside the U.K. 
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But the manifesto also effectively re-confirmed a myth that the internet – whatever that 
was – was unregulated. As Vaidhyanathan (2018: 100) says, ‘the internet has never been a 
global, open, distributed “network of networks” that can connect all of humanity’. The 
internet is not a thing that exists as a singular entity. It is ‘an accidental megastructure’ or 
‘Stack’: ‘a multi-layered structure of software, hardware and network “stacks” that arrange 
different technologies vertically within a modular, interdependent order’ (Brattan, 2015). 
Some parts of these stacks are heavily regulated by states, others less so: the logics of 
different parts of ‘the Stack’ impose their own ordering and regulating also - and 
commercial organisations have overlain their own stacks on top of this (Greenfield, 2017: 
275-287). (For a simple explanation of the interlocking layers from a UK perspective, see 
Collins, 2009:62). 
The manifesto also slips between talk of ‘digital companies’, ‘the internet’, ‘social media 
platforms’, ‘industry’, and ‘content providers’. There is a danger of mis-conceptualization 
here. Sometimes these things may stand for the same thing: sometimes they may be 
different. However, the effect of these concepts, taken together, is that they give the 
impression that internet regulation is about content rather than other things. Perhaps it is 
not surprising, then, that just a few months after the 2017 General Election, the chief 
executive of OFCOM was both agreeing that Facebook and Google were publishers but also 
stating that she didn’t ‘think regulation is the answer because I think it is really hard to 
navigate the boundary between regulation and censorship of the internet’ (Andrews, 2017) 
or that in 2018 the House of Lords Communications Committee was asking for evidence on 
the question ‘The Internet: to regulate or not to regulate?’ (House of Lords, 2018)b. There 
has, as Winseck points out (2019)  been a mounting tide in recent years to treat social media 
platforms and search companies as media organisations who should be regulated as such, 
which has also encouraged the drive to thinking of internet regulation as content regulation. 
The 2017 Conservative manifesto commitments were taken forward in a number of areas, 
notably through the Online Harms White Paper (DCMS, 2019), the Furman report (2019) 
and other matters. The 2019 Conservative manifesto was arguably a much more modest 
document all round. In respect of online regulation, it reiterated commitments on online 
harms and the protection of children and the most vulnerable, and ensuring no safe spaces 
for terrorists online, while at the same time asserting a commitment to defending freedom 
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of expression and ‘the invaluable role of a free press’. It also included a commitment to the 
Digital Services Tax (Conservative Party, 2019).   
Cambridge Analytica: punctuating Zuckerberg’s equilibrium 
Although Facebook had already been the subject of resistance over what Gorwa (2019a) 
calls ‘platform war stories’ relating to Russian interference in the US presidential election 
and Brexit (US Senate, 2018;DOJ, 2019), it was the Cambridge Analytica scandal exposed in 
March 2018 by the Observer, the New York Times and Channel Four which turbo-charged a 
number of parliamentary/legislative, governmental and regulatory investigations 
internationally, building on work initially published in the Observer in 2017. This resulted in 
Facebook chief executive Mark Zuckerberg being called to give evidence before Congress. 
He also gave evidence to a European Parliament hearing, and met with Irish lawmakers on a 
visit to Dublin (Weckler, 2019), but refused invitations from the UK House of Commons and 
the Canadian House of Commons, including when these were meeting with legislators from 
a dozen or so jurisdictions as the International Grand Committee. (House of Commons, 
2018b; CBC, 2018; Lomas 2019; O’Sullivan and Newton, 2019). 
The unprecedented international co-operation between legislators gathered in the 
International Grand Committee has also been matched by international co-operation 
between regulators and law enforcement agencies. Following the UK Information 
Commissioner’s raid on Cambridge Analytica’s London headquarters in March 2018, 
information was shared with the FTC, the FBI, the Irish DPC and other agencies and 
regulators overseas (International Grand Committee, 2018).  
Since then, Facebook has faced fines from the UK Information Commissioner, the US Federal 
Trade Commission and the US Securities and Exchanges Commission. The Canadian 
information commissioner found that Facebook had violated data laws and planned court 
proceedings (OPC, 2019). Facebook was also fined for Cambridge Analytica data issues in 
Brazil and Australia (Brito, 2019, Lomas, 2020b). The SEC said that Facebook had made 
‘misleading disclosures’ in its public filings for more than two years (SEC, 2019). The FTC laid 
down a series of actions affecting Facebook’s internal procedures which Facebook must take 
to comply with the law (FTC, 2019b).  
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The essential issue in the Cambridge Analytica case was that the company obtained 87 
million Facebook user profiles harvested by a personality quiz app, some of which may have 
been used in US elections. A key question relating to the Cambridge Analytica issue remains 
unresolved at present, namely who in Facebook knew what and when? The Guardian 
originally published material about Cambridge Analytica in December 2015 (Davies, 2015). 
Over time a series of questions have emerged as to when senior executives, including 
Zuckerberg, knew about the issue, and the matter is currently being litigated by the 
Attorney-General for Washington DC in the District of Columbia Supreme Court, with 
Facebook seeking to restrict access to certain documents The case is ongoing at the time of 
writing (DC Courts, 2020). California has also sued Facebook for relevant internal emails and 
other documents in relation to data privacy (Kang and McCabe, 2019).  
Some argue that regulation tends to favour larger companies (Aznar, 2020).  Yet the internal 
strains of managing related issues within multiple jurisdictions and legislatures 
simultaneously and maintaining message consistency would be significant for any 
corporation. In Facebook’s case it is fighting on many fronts at the same time on diverse 
issues. It is little surprise that Facebook is one of the largest spenders on lobbying in the US 
and the European Union (Reklaitis, 2019; Cavallone, 2020), recruiting ‘an army’ of lobbyists  
to deal with the wide range of enquiries under way (Dodds, 2019). Facebook’s founder is 
also protected by a corporate governance structure which gives him considerable control 
but with few compensating obligations (Andrews, 2019a:17). 
We may look back on the Cambridge Analytica scandal as the ‘triggering event’ (Dearing and 
Rogers, 1996) which provoked and reinforced greater scrutiny of Facebook, leading to a 
process of regulation in many Western jurisdictions: a process in which Facebook’s 
equilibrium was well and truly punctuated (Cairney, 2012: 199). However, it is too early for 
that. 
  
Regimes of regulation  
Regulation, according to Koop and Lodge (2017) may be defined as ‘intentional intervention 
in the activities of a target population, where the intervention is typically direct - involving 
binding standard-setting, monitoring and sanctioning - and exercised by public-sector actors 
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on the economic activities of private-sector actors’. Regulation is devised amongst other 
reasons to ensure corrective action against perceived harms. I will be focusing on that role 
of regulation to prevent harms occurring or re-occurring. In the case of Facebook, as 
Facebook investor Roger McNamee suggests (2019:113) , regulation can act to change its 
behavioural incentives. Former UK Ofcom chief executive Ed Richards has spoken of the 
value of such incentives: 
By and large, if you can achieve an objective through a nudge mechanism, an 
incentive, a co-ordination or something of that kind, if you are confident that you 
can achieve the outcome, that must be a better way of doing it, generally speaking. 
In my experience it depends on whether the companies feel that it is consistent with 
what they would generally like to do anyway. There is often an incentives problem, I 
think. 
However, Richards confirms that where companies do not want to do something, then they 
will resist if they know that the regulator does not have the powers to make them do so 
(House of Lords, 2014). Former Ofcom regulator Robin Foster (2012) says that, based on 
media regulation lessons, In respect of self-regulation of companies like Facebook ‘there are 
advantages in having some form of statutory underpinning, to secure public trust and clear 
and independent accountability.’ According to the House of Commons DCMS Select 
Committee, as a result of the NetzDG act in Germany, Facebook has contracted more 
content moderators there ewhere itn Europe (House of Commons, 2018). As a result of 
Germany’s laws against holocaust denial, Facebook Policy Head Sir Nick Clegg confirmed, 
Facebook has developed the capacity to geo-block offending content  (Rachman, 2019). 
Regulation incentivises - and disincentivises - certain kinds of behaviour.  
So does taxation. Franklin Foer says that Big Tech companies owe their dominance not only 
to innovation but also to ‘tax avoidance’. Facebook will find itself subject to new kinds of 
digital taxes. In his 2018 budget, the UK Chancellor of the Exchequer, Philip Hammond, 
announced a new Digital Services Tax which, following a consultation (HM Treasury, 2018), 
is now planned to be levied on the revenues of the ‘Big Tech’ companies from 2020. This 
followed speculation over some months that an E.U.-wide tax would be imposed to prevent 
companies using tax arbritrage to ensure that they were taxed in the lowest possible tax 
jurisdictions, and using complicated mechanisms of internal re-charging to re-state their 
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profits in E.U. member states, and discussions within the OECD at G20 level. Facebook has 
accepted that it may have to pay more tax (Hamilon, 2020). It seems likely that the full 
range of taxation measures has yet to be deployed. A number of groups have suggested 
levies on the advertising revenues of companies such as Facebook and Google. Like so many 
other issues, political debate on these issues is emergent rather than conclusive. Taxation is 
one way to address the negative externalities of platforms such as Facebook or to fund 
social goods such as independent news.  
Frequently, scholars depict regulation as a kind of spectrum, moving from consumer action 
through self-regulation to state action. Sometimes as Galbraith reminds us (1952, 1963) 
market action produces corrective action. In 2018 Apple told Facebook that its Onavo app 
breached Apple’s app store rules, so Facebook had to withdraw the app (Seetharaman, 2018 
). That of course also raises questions about Apple’s power.   Meanwhile, advertisers can 
have influence on platforms: Unilever recently announced it would not target children 
younger than 13 with advertising on social media platforms, including Facebook and 
Instagram (Joseph, 2020).   
Saurwein et al (2015), looking at algorithmic risk regulation, envisage a series of steps from 
consumer withdrawal from a service through to state regulation. Hirschmann’s famous 
(1970) conceptualization suggests consumers have essentially two options: exit, and voice. 
But it is hard to exit from Facebook if all of your friends are there (CMA, 2019). Voice, on the 
other hand, has become a more powerful option when amplified by media or political 
intervention. Media interventions can themselves become a form of corrective action, 
according to Mulligan and Griffin (2018), citing Carole Cadwalladr’s 2016 Observer story on 
how Google searches promoted holocaust denial. Ofcom’s research demonstrates parents’ 
concerns about online services (Ofcom, 2019). The ICO investigations into data analytics 
were triggered by reports in the Observer (ICO, 2018a). Barrett and Kreiss (2019) refer to 
these as ‘normative pressure from external stakeholders’. Facebook itself has acknowledged 
that ‘unfavorable media coverage could negatively affect our business’ (Facebook, 2016). 
Political reinforcement of individual complaints may force companies into corrective action, 
as with the Christchurch call following the live-streamed murders by a right-wing terrorist in 
New Zealand, or as happened with Instagram following the tragic suicide of Molly Russell 
and the political reaction to that (BBC, 2019b), which is regularly cited in media reports of 
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corporate actions by Instagram and actions by regulators (Wagner, 2019; Forster, 2020; 
Wright, 2020; BBC, 2019; Thompson, 2019). Facebook’s quarterly Transparency Reports 
reveal how many millions of violent or graphic posts, including of child sexual exploitation 
and abuse, have been removed by the company (see, for example, Facebook 2019b).   
The publication of internal Facebook emails by the House of Commons Digital Culture, 
Media and Sport committee in 2018 and 2019, provided evidence for CMA conclusions 
relating to data exclusion of Twitter’s Vine service and Facebook’s possible discriminatory 
data-sharing with certain commercial partners (House of Commons, 2018, 2019; Campbell, 
2019; Solon and Farivar, 2019; Faroohar, 2019; CMA, 2019). More recently, these 
documents have stimulated a further lawsuit by app developers (Skelton, 2020).   
Internal stakeholders in the form of Facebook employees themselves, and contracted 
Facebook content moderators, have shown resistance to their employer, whether 
individually through leaks (Kulwin, 2018; Newton, 2019a and b) or through collective action, 
such as their open letter to Mark Zuckerberg on political advertising in the autumn of 2019 
(Isaac, 2019b), or legal action (Gray, 2019; Hern, 2019). Former Facebook executives and 
investors have also become vocal critics. 
Gillespie (2018) points out that the moderating role of social media companies, 
implemented through both the community guidelines they adopt and the active content 
moderation process they manage in relation to specific complaints, as well as their 
compliance with laws on illegal content, are key to their operation as platforms, even if, as 
he rightly argues, the Facebook content moderation guidelines leaked in 2017 looked 
‘cobbled together’ and we have evidence that commercial factors influence Facebook’s 
decisions on whether to remove content (Channel Four, 2018). Moderation also takes a 
huge toll on moderators (Newton, 2019a and b; Gray, 2019). Facebook has of course 
announced a $130million investment in a new Oversight Board (Clegg, 2019  Harris, 2019; 
Huber, 2019; Levy, 2020a). Scholars have raised many questions about this and its operation 
(see Douek, 2019a and b; Keller, 2019a.; Van Loo, 2020). There is no doubt that Facebook 
systems can anticipate and prevent the uploading of certain kinds of material (Rachman, 
2019). Social media companies would prefer their users to be self-policing - hence 
community guidelines - but as they are not, they have to moderate - and in Facebook’s case, 
 19 
 
at ‘industrial scale, as Caplan (2019) says. But as Gillespie remarks (2018:6) ‘the very fact of 
moderation shapes social media platforms as tools, as institutions, and as cultural 
phenomena.’ The reality is that whatever regulatory structure is put in place for policing 
online content, company self-regulation by Facebook and others will form a part. Table Four 
gives some examples of different kinds of Facebook regulation in operation. Regulatory 
proposals range from reliance on the general law, public pressure, company self-regulation, 
agreed industry collective norms of self-regulation by trade bodies, formal co-regulation -  
known in Germany as ‘regulated self-regulation’ (well-explained by Marsden et al, 2019), 
involving co-operation by companies and regulators according to agreed codes of conduct, 
and formal regulation set down in and underpinned by statute. 
Table Four about here  
Conceiving of regulation as a dynamic ‘process’ allows us to conceptualise regulation over 
time, from the identification of a problem to the development of regulatory mechanisms to 
address it and then the necessary enforcement actions, which may themselves be 
challenged in litigation by those being regulated.  
 
Facebook’s litigated narrative 
In Facebook’s case, it sometimes uses litigation to challenge regulatory outcomes before 
they are finalised, allowing agreed and sometimes ‘no-fault’ outcomes to be adopted. To list 
but five examples since 2019: 
• In its latest earnings report in January 2020, Facebook confirmed that it would pay 
$550 million to settle a class-action suit in Illinois regarding facial recognition 
technology (Facebook, 2020; Singer and Isaac, 2020)  
• The SEC action against Facebook in 2019 resulted in an agreed settlement of $100 
million. (‘Without admitting or denying the SEC’s allegations, Facebook has agreed to 
the entry of a final judgment ordering a $100 million penalty and permanently 
enjoining it from violating Sections 17(a)(2) and 17(a)(3) of the Securities Act of 1933 
and Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and Rules 12b-20, 13a-1, 
13a-13, and 13a-15(a) thereunder’: SEC, 2019)  
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• The FTC action of 2019 resulted in a settlement for $5 billion plus a range of actions 
to be taken by Facebook designed to better protect user data.  (‘Following extensive 
negotiations, the parties have settled the Complaint’s allegations by the Stipulated 
Order.’) (FTC, 2019c) 
• The Information Commission Officer’s £500,000 Monetary Penalty Notice (MPN) 
against Facebook in 2019 resulted in a settlement under which both sides paid their 
legal costs. Facebook agreed to pay the £500,000 but admitted no liability (‘An 
agreement has now been reached between the parties. As part of this agreement, 
Facebook and the ICO have agreed to withdraw their respective appeals. Facebook 
has agreed to pay the £500,000 fine but has made no admission of liability in relation 
to the MPN.’) (ICO, 2019d). 
• In November 2019, Facebook paid $40 million to settle a case in the Oakland Division 
of the US District Court of the Northern District of California brought by advertisers 
who complained that Facebook had fraudulently inflated viewing metrics - ‘the 
average watch times’ of videos shown on the platform. Facebook said ‘This lawsuit is 
without merit but we believe resolving this case is in the best interests of the 
company and advertisers‘ (Sloane, 2019).  
Facebook also continues to contest the 2019 German Bundeskartellamt ruling on its data 
collection and advertising procedures in the German courts (Colangelo, 2019). 
It is not possible to state that this is a deliberate overall strategy by Facebook and no doubt 
the organisation would state that each case is treated on its merits. But agreed settlements 
have the advantage of limiting court proceedings which could require the public release of 
internal company documentation. It is perhaps not surprising that so many of the regulatory 
reports relevant to Facebook produced between 2018 and 2020 refer to the need for 
regulators to have strong information-gathering powers.  
We will come to the question of whether or not Facebook is a specific new form of 
corporate entity which requires a new form of regulation in due course. Figure One helps us 
to conceptualise the process of regulation: 
 
Figure One about here  
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Some see Facebook’s latest moves to integrate and encrypt their core services as an 
attempt to avoid regulation, allowing them to deny knowledge of harmful content being 
shared. This worries lawmakers globally and has contributed to the increasing focus on 
Facebook from a state security perspective (Home Office, 2019).  
 
A new kind of entity? 
The concerns that Facebook raises for regulators derive from its size and dominance, its 
wealth, the variety of services it provides, its vertical integration, its cutting edge science, its 
ability to leverage into other markets and services, its integration into our daily and political 
lives, and its ownership structure. 
There has been a long debate about whether Facebook is a publisher or a media company. 
Facebook’s preferred position is that it is a new kind of entity, according to its chief 
executive:  
Facebook is a new kind of platform. It’s not a traditional technology company. It’s 
not a traditional media company (Gibbs, 2016).  
In 2020, he said it should be regulated like something in between a telecom company and a 
newspaper (Reuters, 2020). The House of Commons DCMS Select Committee (2018) argued 
for a new category of ‘tech company’ that was neither platform or publisher. 
Definitions of their role has changed over time. For many years they were called 
‘intermediaries’ by academics and regulators (Foster, 2014; Helberger et al, 2015; Tambini 
and Labo, 2015), - a term which Facebook (2020) adopts in its recent White Paper on online 
content moderation, saying:  
Despite their best efforts to thwart the spread of harmful content, internet 
platforms are intermediaries, not the speakers, of such speech, and it would be 
impractical and harmful to require internet platforms to approve each post before 
allowing it.  
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Platforms are not intermediaries, says Gillespie (2018a): ‘Platforms do not just mediate 
public discourse: they constitute it.’ Even the term ‘Platforms’ is a concept which reflects 
these companies’ own ‘discursive power’(Gillespie, 2010).  
Zuckerberg has also stated on many occasions that Facebook is a utility – a social utility or 
social infrastructure (Andrews, 2019a). Utilities and infrastructure are clearly regulated. Big 
Tech companies have been called platform utilities, attention utilities, and information 
utilities (Warren, 2019; Hindman, 2018; Andrews, 2019a). Data has been said to be ‘an 
essential facility’ (Tucker, 2019; Warner, 2018). Feld (2019) has called for a ‘digital platform 
act’ in the United States. The House of Lords Committee on Artificial Intelligence referred to 
Big Tech companies as data monopolies: the UK ICO referred to them as information 
monopolies (House of Lords, 2018a). The Furman review (2019) accepted that they shared 
‘some important characteristics with natural monopolies’ but said that it was too early to 
conclude that competition policy could not work.  The centrality of data to their business 
model is now under investigation by data protection and competition authorities. Facebook 
is clearly an advertising platform and its role in the advertising market, along with that of 
Google, has recently become key to examinations of market power in the eyes of 
competition authorities around the world (ACCC, 2018 and 2019; Bundeskartellamt, 2019; 
CMA, 2019). 
Many commentators focus on the uniqueness of the platforms and their business models. 
Furman says that ‘the scale and breadth of data that large digital companies have been able 
to amass, usually generated as a by-product of an activity, is unprecedented’. The centrality 
of that data to their business model is unique. There was clear concentration in certain 
markets such as search, social media and online advertising, and incumbents had a 
significant data advantage which was a barrier to entry and therefore likely to lead to 
unchallenged persistent dominance because of their market power. They present a ‘unique 
set of policy challenges’ (Ofcom, 2019b). 
Platforms such as Facebook and Google have significant economic power. This has been 
analysed in competition terms. Concepts such as structural market power have existed in 
competition policy for some time (See, for example, Ofcom, 2016). Furman (2019) 
introduces the concept of ‘strategic market status, with enduring market power over a 
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strategic bottleneck market’, and this definition is taken up by the CMA (2019). The 
Australian competition authority referred to their ‘strategic market power’ (ACCC, 2018).  
Platforms also have ‘significant social and political power’ (CDEI, 2020). They are ‘uniquely 
powerful political actors’: ‘Google and Facebook may be the most powerful political agents 
of our time’.  They are able to pay for the best talent, complicating oversight, and they can 
‘use information asymmetries to by-pass regulations without much awareness’(Stigler, 
2019).They have what Pasquale (2017) called ‘functional sovereignty.’ This has led to some 
to refer to Facebook as ‘a sovereign state’ or polity (Farrell, Levi and O’Reilly, 2018; 
Rosenberg, 2019; Howell, 2020) or Facebookistan (MacKinnon, 2010, 2012; Chander 2011; 
Coll,2012). Denmark has appointed a digital ambassador specifically to liaise with Silicon 
Valley companies and China in what it has termed ‘techplomacy’ (Techamb, 2017). 
Platforms have also been called ‘Digital Switzerlands’, with a claim that they are both on a 
par with nation-states and also ‘neutral’, a claim that Eichensehr (2018) dismantles. 
 
Facebook’s scale, dominance, indispensability and intimacy are factors driving regulatory 
action. Martin Moore and Damian Tambini state (2018) that digital platforms operate not 
only on a scale bigger than previous regulatory challenges, giving them structural 
dominance, but also have explicit political and social aims and perform genuine civic 
functions. Tarleton Gillespie (2018a) says that social media platforms are neither conduit 
nor content, nor just network or media, but a hybrid not previously anticipated in 
regulation: ‘a fundamentally new information configuration, materially, institutionally, 
financially, and socially’. Plantin et al (2018) note how they have become indispensable to 
people. They also have an intimate relationship with users (Yiu, 2019). They seek to become 
‘the operating system of our lives’ (Vaidhyanathan, 2018). 
 
UK Regulatory approaches to Facebook 
 
Although ‘online harms’ often attract the bulk of media attention, the new challenges to 
Facebook’s power come principally from the intersection of data protection policy and 
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competition policy which is under active discussion both at academic and institutional levels 
and in consumer lobbying in the EU and publisher lobbying globally  (Stucke and Grunes, 
2016; Helberger et al, 2017; Colangelo and Maggiolino, 2018; Wu, 2018; Srinivasan, 2019; 
Ezrachi, 2018; BEUC, 2018; DCN, 2018); and the concerns about Facebook as a threat (1) to 
state security and (2) to the financial markets.  
 
Drawing on the empirical research, it is clear that there is a significant and growing range of 
areas of regulatory interest in Facebook in the UK, including the ‘online harms’ question that 
is generally discussed as the focus of platform regulation. Some regulators, notably those 
with horizontal responsibilities, such as the Information Commissioner’s Office and the 
Competition and Markets Authority, may have roles which arise in a number of these issues. 
But sectoral regulators such as Ofcom may also have interests in a number of policy 
domains. Ofcom (2019b) has also drawn attention to the interlocking nature of these issues, 
and argued that market failures may have a significant impact on, for example, the 
development of online harms. This economic perspective restores political economy to the 
heart of discussions about platforms, rather than a narrow focus on measures to address 
harms through platform liability for harmful and illegal content alone. Ofcom argues that 
market failures can contribute to consumer and societal harms, taking a broader definition 
than that in the UK Government’s Online Harms White Paper, including competition, 
consumer, data protection, cyber security, media policy, content policy and public health, 
and interventions can benefit from tackling several market failures at once, tackling several 
harms at once, and effective ‘trading off’ of specific harms.  
Ofcom’s document notes that there are clear interactions between harms and their market 
failures which create policy overlaps.  Adopting ‘a single “policy lens”’ risks not addressing 
the problem effectively. The economic analysis presented acknowledges that the risk of 
regulatory failure is high, as these companies are concentrated, global, move at a fast pace, 
are driven by complex business models and are handling a vast range of content. Business 
models can disguise the cause of harms. Platforms have an incentive to maintain attention 
and accumulate personal data, and this logic drives approaches to privacy, content, diversity 
exposure, addiction, data analytics and algorithms, personalization of advertising, 
information asymmetry and behavioural biases. Regulators need to prioritise and take a 
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proportionate response. Future outcomes are hard to predict, and consumers and 
producers may react in unanticipated ways. Remedies are likely ‘to be more effective if they 
address each of the different market failures which are at the source of a harm’. Regulations 
need to be flexible, to emphasis opportunities for market entry and innovation, and need to 
be future-proofed.  
The range of regulatory approaches is driven to some extent by regulatory mandates and 
the institutional logics of government departments and regulators, given their foundational 
legislation and the laws and regulations for which they are responsible. Ofcom’s economic 
analysis identifies ‘complex interactions’ which require cooperation between regulators.  
 
Online Harms  
The UK Government’s principal intervention on online harms came in the April 2019 Online 
Harms White Paper, (DCMS, 2019a), supplemented by the Digital Charter (DCMS, 2018) and 
the Code of Practice for Providers of Online Social Media Platforms (DCMS, 2019b). The 
White Paper built on the 2017 Internet Safety Strategy Green Paper (DCMS, 2017) and 
sections of the 2017 Digital Economy Act which imposed responsibilities on social media 
companies to agree to a code of conduct and accept age-verification regulation by the 
British Board of Film Classification (BBFC). Subsequent announcements from DCMS have 
confirmed that the age-verification proposals have been dropped (DCMS, 2019b). The White 
Paper acknowledged that there was existing regulation but described what it called ‘a 
fragmented regulatory environment’. The UK Government’s Initial Consultation Response 
was published in February 2020 (DCMS, 2020a). This confirmed that Ofcom was considered 
to be the preferred choice as online regulator, because ‘this would allow us to build on 
Ofcom’s expertise, avoid fragmentation of the regulatory landscape and enable quick 
progress on this important issue.’ Ofcom of course has both content and competition 
responsibilities already and has ‘organisational expertise, robustness, and experience of 
delivering challenging, high-profile remits across a range of sectors’. Ofcom had contributed 
to the discussions on the evolving policy, drawing lessons from its engagement with 
broadcasting and on-demand standards regulation (Ofcom, 2018a),  recognising that 
existing frameworks could not be transferred ‘wholesale’ to online, but certain principles 
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could be relevant. It also identified that the same piece of content could be regulated 
differently depending on how it was consumed: ‘differences in regulation appear 
increasingly arbitrary’.  Ofcom also published research on users’ online concerns (2018b). 
Other regulators, such as the Financial Conduct Authority, wanted various kinds of online 
scams to be included in the regulatory approach. 
  
The Initial Consultation Response confirmed the White Paper’s plans for a duty of care on 
social media providers to be set down in regulation. There would be an emphasis on 
companies being able to prove that they had systems to provide such a duty of care. The 
proposals had been amended following the consultation after concerns expressed about 
freedom of expression and which businesses were in scope. It was also felt that the list of 
harms was drawn too broadly. There would be greater transparency about content removal. 
Legal content posted by adults would not be prohibited.  
There had been criticism that the original White Paper appeared likely to clamp down on 
content that was regarded as harmful but was not illegal (Keller, 2019; Smith, 2020), 
resulting in a ‘Digital Nanny State’ (Dutton, 2019). The revised approach is to focus on the 
wider systems and processes that platforms have in place, with a ‘differentiated approach’ 
to illegal content from that which is legal but potentially harmful. The new regulatory 
framework would require companies ‘to explicitly state what content and behaviour is 
acceptable’ and to enforce this ’effectively, consistently and transparently’. There should be 
higher levels of protection for children. Illegal content must be ‘removed expeditiously’, and 
the risk of it appearing should be ‘minimised by effective systems’. Threats to national 
security and the physical safety of children would demand ‘particularly robust action’. 
Clarity was given on the nature of companies ‘in scope’ – platforms driven by user-
generated content, rather than any company with a social media page. Companies would 
have to commit to transparency reports as indicated in the original White Paper and there 
would be a ‘Multi-stakeholder Transparency Working Group’ chaired by the Minister for 
Digital and Broadband, and a Consumer Forum for Communications. The government would 
shortly be publishing its first Transparency Report based on social media companies 
reporting.  
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In terms of enforcement, it was important that company executives ‘are sufficiently 
incentivised to take online safety seriously.’ The White Paper had proposed that there 
should be provisions for ‘senior management liability’ and ‘business disruption measures’ to 
which the government was giving further consideration.  
This was a legislative priority for the government. While legislative preparations continued 
other wider measures were being introduced including: 
• Interim codes of practice on terrorist and child sexual exploitation and abuse (CSEA) 
content and activity 
• The Transparency Report 
• A report into the safety technology ecosystem 
• Wider regulation and governance of the digital landscape including election integrity 
 
Meanwhile, the Law Commission (2018) had reviewed existing legislation on abusive and 
offensive online communications such as the Malicious Communications Act and its overlaps 
with other legislation and gaps in scope. 
 
 
 
Public Safety and National Security 
Platforms have been a focus of national security and public safety concerns for some time, 
with the UK government regarding itself as a leader in the field of combating terrorism 
online (House of Commons, 2017b). Issues such as disinformation have ridden up the 
political agenda in the context of Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour (CIB), with six Select 
Committees coming together to consider disinformation (House of Commons, 2019d) and a 
new House of Lords Committee on Democracy and Digital Technologies (House of Lords, 
2020). Recent research illustrates that this still remains a significant challenge (NATO, 2019). 
International action has been taken, with platform co-operation, in forums such as the EU 
(EC, 2018). The U.K.’s broad approach was set out in the 2018 National Security Capability 
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Review (Cabinet Office, 2018). Addressing CIB  requires detailed and regular pressure and 
actions from governments and platforms (Facebook,2019c), with the Coronavirus outbreak 
providing the latest example (BBC, 2020b) . As the Stigler review noted (2018), and the 
Mueller indictments confirmed (Special Counsel, 2018), hostile state actors have learned 
how to exploit platform power, and that of Facebook in particular, though this has had more 
public exposure in the USA than in the UK: indeed, some of the material produced for the 
U.S. Senate has given a more in-depth overview than that available in the UK (US Senate, 
2018). 
On an operational level, the Metropolitan Police Counter Terrorism Internet Referral Unit 
(CTIRU) assesses material against UK terrorism legislation and refers it to platforms for 
removal. Though there is legal provision for the police to issue a takedown notice to 
platforms under the 2006 Terrorism Act, on the whole as the main providers are located 
headquartered overseas the police work on a voluntary basis with platforms. The main 
ones, including Facebook, now cooperate through the Global Internet Forum to Counter 
Terrorism (GIFCT) established in 2017. It is widely recognised that Facebook has had 
considerable success in addressing particularly ISIS/DAESH-related terrorist organisation, 
propaganda and recruitment material (though not completely – see Waters and Postings, 
2018) and it has invested more on security in recent years (see Thompson, 2020).    
More recently, the announcement by Mark Zuckerberg of Facebook’s ‘privacy pivot’ 
(Zuckerberg, 2019) has raised specific concerns from the UK, Australian, Canadian, US and 
New Zealand Governments – the ‘Five Eyes’ governments - regarding access by law 
enforcement agencies to the communications of criminals, terrorists and ‘those who 
threaten public safety’ (Home Office, 2019). Zuckerberg said: 
I believe the future of communication will increasingly shift to private, encrypted 
services where people can be confident what they say to each other stays secure and 
their messages and content won't stick around forever. This is the future I hope we 
will help bring about.  
We plan to build this the way we've developed WhatsApp: focus on the most 
fundamental and private use case -- messaging -- make it as secure as possible, and 
then build more ways for people to interact on top of that, including calls, video 
chats, groups, stories, businesses, payments, commerce, and ultimately a platform 
for many other kinds of private services (Facebook, 2019). 
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As the Home Office Director of National Security said in written testimony to the US Senate 
Judiciary Committee Inquiry ‘there is a particular challenge when companies design their 
services  in such a way that even they cannot see the content of their users’ 
communications’ (Home Office, 2019b). This would not only hamper law enforcement but 
also diminish Facebook’s ‘own ability to identify and tackle the most serious illegal content 
and activity running over its platform, including grooming, indecent imagery of children, 
terrorist propaganda and attack planning’. She gave evidence that this would remove 12 
million reports to the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children every year, noting 
‘in 2018, those reports will have led to more than 2500 arrests by UK law enforcement and 
almost 3000 children safeguarded in the UK alone.’ Her evidence stated passionately: 
That is in only one country. That is only in one year. That is based on referrals from 
only one company. That is what we stand to lose. 
She noted that the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children (NSPCC) 
estimated that there were 11 reports of online sex crimes in the UK from Facebook services 
every single day on average. Facebook had confirmed that it had acted against 26million 
pieces of terrorist content between October 2017 and March 2019 and that the company 
had not quantified how much of that material would have escaped detection if end to end 
encryption had been in place. Over 100 charities and academics from around the world have 
written to Facebook asking for its plans to be halted (BBC, 2020c).  
The UK Home Secretary was the lead signatory on a letter to Mark Zuckerberg along with 
the US and Australian governments in October 2019 urging him not to go along with these 
plans (Home Office, 2019a) without putting protections in place. The letter noted that ‘more 
than 99% of the content Facebook takes action against – both for child sexual exploitation 
and terrorism – is identified by your safety systems, rather than by reports from users’. The 
danger was that this could be lost. Facebook responded through a letter from WhatsApp 
Head Will Cathcart and Facebook Messenger Head Stan Chudnovsky, rejecting the request, 
arguing 
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Cybersecurity experts have repeatedly proven that when you weaken any part of an 
encrypted system, you weaken it for everyone, everywhere. The ‘backdoor’ access 
you are demanding for law enforcement would be a gift to criminals, hackers and 
repressive regimes, creating a way for them to enter our systems and leaving every 
person on our platforms more vulnerable to real-life harm. It is simply impossible to 
create such a backdoor for one purpose and not expect others to try and open it. 
(Facebook, 2019d) 
Home Office concerns have been reinforced by statements from the UK security services 
(Fisher, 2018)  and police (Holden, 2018), and the Defence Secretary (Shipman, 2020), based 
on UK encryption security principles expressed by national cybersecurity leaders (Levy and 
Robinson, 2018).  India is also seeking to legislate for traceability of messaging (Newton, 
2020a, Mehta, 2020). 
Facebook endorsed the Christchurch call to action (Facebook, 2019) after the New Zealand 
terrorist action live-streamed on Facebook, though actions fell short of the dropping of live-
streaming called for shortly afterwards by the UK Digital Minister (Andrews, 2019a).  
 
Elections 
There is widespread consensus that the UK’s electoral laws have not kept pace with digital 
technology (HC, 2019b; APPGECT, 2020). Dommett (2019) identified 230 discrete 
recommendations from 14 Parliamentary Committees and other relevant bodies for reform. 
The Prime Minister’s chief of staff Dominic Cummings has himself said that electoral laws 
are out of date (Cadwalladr and Townsend, 2019). The Electoral Commission (2018) put 
forward specific recommendations in 2018, calling for legal changes for digital imprints 
stating who is behind the campaign and who created it, more clarity from campaigners on 
digital spending, clarity on the prohibition of spending by foreign organisations and 
individuals, larger fines and strengthened enforcement, including information-gathering 
powers for the commission. It called on social media companies to work with the 
Commission to improve their policies, labelling political advertising, ensuring their political 
advert databases are in alignment with UK rules. There were also reports from the Law 
Commission (2016 and 2020) and the House of Commons Public Administration and 
Constitutional Affairs Committee (House of Commons, 2019c). Facebook has announced a 
series of changes to its own policing of election advertising since the 2016 US Presidential 
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election (see, for example, Facebook, 2018b), but made it clear that it would not prevent 
election candidates telling lies (Facebook, 2019a; Gold and O’Sullivan, 2019).  
Following the 2017 UK General Election, the Committee on Standards in Public Life (CPSL) 
was asked to review the question of intimidation of candidates in elections. The CPSL report 
found that social media had ’accelerated and enabled intimidatory behaviour’, acted as 
though they had little liability, and that companies like Facebook, Twitter and Google were 
not just platforms for people to post material but also shaped what users see. The UK 
government should legislate to shift liability toward social media companies, who should 
also be forced to provide automated techniques to deal with intimidatory content, prevent 
pile-ons, develop more tools for users to report, take decisions faster and remove content 
more quickly, and report on their performance on taking down such material, and actively 
provide safety advice to candidates. Meanwhile, the Government should introduce a new 
electoral offence of intimidation (CPSL 2017a and b).  
The UK Government has consulted on its response to both the Electoral Commission and 
CPSL reports (Cabinet Office, 2018b and 2019) indicating it is minded to introduce a new 
offence, introduce a digital imprint regime, and strengthen the Electoral Commission’s 
powers and sanctions. However, the 2019 General Election went ahead with a range of 
inauthentic advertising from unregulated groups, such as the Fair Tax Campaign and 
continual use of data mining. 
Data analytics and advertising technology 
The Cambridge Analytica case specifically led to an inquiry into the use of data analytics in 
political campaigns by the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO, 2018a,b,c) following 
reports by the Observer newspaper in 2017. Following further reports by the Observer, 
Channel Four News and the New York Times in March 2018 ‘the inquiry eventually 
broadened and has become the largest investigation of its type by any Data Protection 
Authority involving social media platforms, data brokers, analytics firms, academic 
institutions, political parties and campaign groups’ (ICO, 2018a). The key allegations centred 
on data use in the 2016 UK referendum on EU membership and the US Presidential election 
leading to warning letters to political parties, prosecutions of Cambridge Analytica’s parent 
company SCL, auditing of Cambridge University’s data lab, action against Leave.EU and 
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Eldon insurance, a fine of £500,000 to Facebook, and reference of the Canadian company 
Aggregate IQ to Canadian authorities for non-compliance with the ICO.  
The ICO had to use its full range of powers but also seek more, which were granted in the 
2018 Data Protection Act following pressure from the House of Commons Digital, Culture, 
Media and Sport Select Committee (House of Commons, 2018a), which itself undertook a 
series of hearings with key representatives of Cambridge Analytica. There was significant 
international and inter-agency cooperation with the National Crime Agency, the Electoral 
Commission, the Irish Data Protection Commissioner (as the lead EU data protection 
authority for Facebook) and regulatory and law enforcement bodies in the US and Canada. 
Facebook’s fine was an indication of the seriousness of its breaches and would have been 
higher if GDPR had been in operation. Facebook was guilty of ‘repeated failures’ to protect 
user data. The ICO said that the Government should legislate for a statutory code of practice 
for the use of personal data in political campaigns and review the regulatory gaps in the 
‘content and provenance and jurisdictional scope of political advertising online.’ She also 
caused for an ‘ethical pause’ in the use of these micro-targeting technologies (ICO, 2018b). 
Indeed, it is micro-targeting which many researchers, and Facebook employees, say forms 
the biggest threat (Vaidhyanathan, 2019; Isaacs, 2019b) and so does the chair of the US 
Federal Election Commission (Weintraub, 2019). Mozilla and others called for a moratorium 
during the 2019 UK general election. The ICO launched a code of practice for political data 
(ICO, 2019e). 
The ICO’s work on data analytics in political campaigns (ICO, 2018b) explained how 
Facebook’s advertising system worked. Mark Zuckerberg and former Facebook advertising 
manager Antonio Garcia Martinez have explained how the real time bidding for Facebook 
advertisements works (Andrews, 2019a: 41). More recently, the ICO has led examinations of 
advertising technology. Initial consumer research it carried out with the aid of Ofcom (ICO, 
2019b) indicated that people accepted that websites displayed advertising in return for free 
access. While they want advertisements that are relevant to them, they feel they have little 
control, and once they are shown how adtech works ‘there is a notable shift in perceptions 
towards websites showing adverts as being unacceptable.’ The ICO held an industry fact-
finding forum (ICO, 2019a) on the back of this research which enabled it ‘to better 
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understand the challenges and views of the different aspects of a complex system’ 
(MacDougall, 2019a).  
The ICO’s Update report into Adtech and RTB (Real-time bidding) sought to establish 
whether RTB complied with GDPR and The Privacy and Electronic Communications 
Regulations (ICO, 2019c). They had specific concerns about special category data – data 
identified under GDPR as 
• personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin; 
• personal data revealing political opinions; 
• personal data revealing religious or philosophical beliefs;  
• personal data revealing trade union membership;  
• genetic data; 
• biometric data (where used for identification purposes); 
• data concerning health; 
• data concerning a person’s sex life; and 
• data concerning a person’s sexual orientation. 
 
But in general, the ICO was concerned about the lawful basis of adtech, in particular that the 
creation and sharing of personal data profiles was ‘disproportionate, intrusive and unfair’, 
with one visit to a website resulting in a person’s personal data being seen by hundreds of 
organisations. There were major issues of consent and transparency, and dangers of data 
leakage across the supply chain.   
Overall, the ICO felt that the adtech industry ‘appears immature in its understanding of data 
protection requirements.’ Individuals could have no guarantees about the security of their 
data: 
Thousands of organisations are processing billions of bid requests in the Uk each 
week with (at best) inconsistent application of adequate technical and organisational 
measures to secure the data in transit and at rest, and with little or no consideration 
ass to the requirements of data protection law about international transfers of 
personal data. 
The ICO’s concerns would not be addressed without intervention, but this needed to be 
measured and adaptive, because this was ‘an extremely complex market involving multiple 
technologies and actors’. They noted that industry was taking some action. They also had 
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concerns about the ‘economic vulnerability’ of smaller publishers. The adtech ecosystem 
was complex, with some market participants playing multiple roles. It appeared that Google 
and the Internet Advertising Bureau made some practical changes as a result of this 
(MacDougall, 2020a), but some were dragging their feet, meaning that further regulatory 
action was likely.  
 
Competition, Mergers and Antitrust and Consumer Protection  
The UK Government’s Industrial Strategy was firmly rooted in the exploitation of data and 
new technologies (BEIS, 2017). Competition issues in digital markets have been on the 
agenda of the UK government since the publication of the Consumer Markets Green Paper 
in April 2018 (BEIS, 2018). This called for digital markets ‘that work for consumers’ with a 
focus on data portability and competition enforcement. The online advertising market, and 
its dominance by Facebook and Google, was specifically cited and will be addressed in the 
next section. The paper noted that ‘platforms operating in digital markets pose challenges 
to the established techniques for assessing competition in markets.’ These markets were 
shaped by network effects and were marked by concentration. Platforms could lock in 
consumers ‘or leverage their market power to detrimentally influence other markets’. The 
consultation sought views on digital platforms, agglomeration, data algorithms and 
consolidation of consumers. The document included a draft strategic steer to the 
Competition and Markets Authority which included the need to ‘address the challenges of 
the digital economy’, including anti-competitive behaviour. Subsequently, the Secretary of 
State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy published the final Strategic Steer to the 
CMA stressing the need for swifter conclusion of competition inquiries (BEIS, 2019a). BEIS 
also published the Competition Law Review, (2019cb, which noted ‘particular concerns have 
also been raised about the ability of the current regime to deal effectively and swiftly with 
concerns in digital markets‘, promising a subsequent Competition Green Paper. 
Recent statements by both the chief executive and Chair of the CMA have indicated an 
acceptance that merger control in digital markets had been a specific failure. The chair, Lord 
Tyrie referred to ‘underenforcement’ in respect of digital mergers. The chief executive, 
Andrea Coscelli, said Facebook’s acquisitions of WhatsApp and Instagram had been 
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examples of ‘merger control gone wrong’ and the Instagram acquisition had given Facebook 
an unforeseen ‘competitive advantage’ (Beioley, 2020). In evidence to the House of Lords, 
he had previously suggested that ‘the creation of data monopolies’ could be added as a 
fourth public interest category when judging mergers (House of Lords, 2018c). A paper from 
the Bank of England has also concluded that ‘the incumbency advantage of dominant 
platforms is, arguably, the most prominent competition issue in the area of competition 
policy’ (Siciliani and Giovannetti, 2019).  
The UK Treasury and the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy had jointly 
commissioned the Digital Competition Expert Panel, whose report Unlocking Digital 
Competition (HMT/BEIS, 2019), has become known as the Furman report after its chair. The 
report said that standard competition policy tools could play a role but needed updating. 
The focus needed to be on promoting competition, fostering new entrants, and benefitting 
consumers. There needed to be a code of conduct for the biggest platforms, data mobility, 
open standards and data openness. The Panel disagreed that platforms were natural 
monopolies which needed utility regulation but there needed to be a clear set of rules to 
limit anti-competitive activities by the most significant platforms and reduce structural 
barriers to competition.  Merger control should be more active and focused on innovation. 
There needed to be clearer ex ante rules but also post-merger antitrust enforcement, which 
also needed to be faster and more effective, with more interim measures. The Panel noted 
that digital markets were subject to ‘tipping’ in which the winner took most of the market. 
Competition alone could not deal with tipping – there needed to be intervention. The report 
noted that ‘governments and regulators are at an enormous informational disadvantage 
relative to technology companies.’ Well-functioning digital markets with more choice for 
consumers could also help address some online harm issues, forcing competition on the 
basis of quality and consumer care. The UK needed a Digital Markets Unit with strong links 
to the CMA, Ofcom and the ICO able to impose measures where a company had ‘strategic 
market status, with enduring market power over a strategic bottleneck market.’ The report 
noted Facebook’s acquisitions of WhatsApp and Instagram and Google’s acquisitions of 
Doubleclick and Youtube had faced little questioning. Of 400 acquisitions by the largest 
firms, none had been blocked and few had had conditions attached. In terms of merger 
policy, there needed to be a reset. Harm to innovation and potential competition – 
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preventing the emergence of a potential competitor - should be part of the CMA’s 
assessment. It warned about ‘the threat of killer acquisitions’. Digital companies with 
strategic market status must notify the CMA of planned acquisitions. There needed to be a 
legislative change so that the CMA could take a ‘balance of harms’ approach. The CMA 
should retrospectively review cases not brought, use its interim measures powers more,  
and strengthen its information-gathering powers. The evolution of algorithms and artificial 
intelligence should be monitored by the government, the CMA and the CDEI to avoid anti-
competitive behaviour. The CMA should conduct a market study into the digital advertising 
market. The UK government should encourage a pro-competition approach to competition 
policy internationally in co-operation with governments and competition authorities 
overseas, with digital competition reviews already underway in Australia, France, Germany, 
Israel, Japan, the US and the EU. It said that there was some evidence of tensions between 
competition law and data protection law, including with GDPR.  
In identifying strategic market status, Furman said ‘the scale and breadth of data that large 
digital companies have been able to amass, usually generated as a by-product if an activity, 
is unprecedented’ – and the centrality of this data to their business models was unique, 
leading to concentration in specific markets like search and social media and online 
advertising. Incumbents had a clear data advantage which led to permanent dominance and 
market power. Markets could not therefore be considered ‘freely contestable’. Specifically 
in respect of Facebook, Furman noted that the Cambridge Analytica scandal, and the 
discriminatory sharing of data exposed by the House of Commons DCMS Select Committee 
publication of documents from the Six4Three court case in California, could be interpreted 
as ‘an indicator of low quality caused by a lack of competition’  (Solon and Farivar, 2019 a 
and b). The OFT might have been at fault in allowing Facebook’s acquisition of Instagram. 
Data as the focus of anti-trust policy can also be seen in recent statements from the US 
Department of Justice and the European Commission (McGill, 2020; Faroohar, 2020). The 
FTC in the United States is also now looking into past acquisitions by Big Tech companies to 
identify whether they have undertaken ‘killer acquisitions’ (Kamepalli et al, 2019) intended 
to eliminate emergent competition (Eichlin and de Fays, 2020). Facebook has now produced 
new tools allowing users to understand how data is gathered on them offline (Lomas 
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2020a).  Other proposals to address the value of data (Coyle et al, 2020), or to treat it as a 
public good akin to spectrum (Napoli, 2019), have also been brought forward. 
The Online Advertising Market 
The CMA had been urged by the House of Lords Communications Select Committee (2018, 
2019), the House of Commons DCMS Select Committee (2019), the Furman Review (2019), 
the Cairncross Review (2019) and the Chancellor of the Exchequer (Hammond, 2019) to 
conduct a review of the online advertising market but for some time warned that Brexit 
preparations were an obstacle to this (House of Lords, 2018c; House of Commons, 2018a). 
Its interim report (2019) was published shortly after the 2019 UK General Election.  
The CMA noted that Google and Facebook consumed 30% of UK Internet users time. Google 
had 90% of search advertising; Facebook nearly 50% of display.  The CMA was ‘concerned 
that they are now both so large and have such extensive access to data that potential rivals 
can no longer compete on equal terms’. That could be a block on innovation and could force 
consumers to give up more data than they wished. The CMA wished to consult on a range of 
interventions including a code of conduct to govern the behaviour of ‘platforms with market 
power’ rules to give consumers greater control over data; and interventions to address the 
market power of Google and Facebook (including data access remedies, consumer default 
avoidance,  measures to increase interoperability and structural interventions). The report 
was also intended, alongside Furman and the Stigler inquiry in the US, which included 30 
prominent global academic specialists, to contribute to the debate on ‘online platforms’ 
regulation. There was a need for a sound understanding of the business models of 
advertiser-funded platforms, which were different from those of non-advertiser funded 
platforms.  
The issues the CMA was considering were important because lack of competition could 
inhibit competition; services were paid for by advertising, and in an uncompetitive market 
costs to consumers for advertised products could rise; if content providers received less 
than they should in revenue they would be unable to invest sufficiently in content 
generation; limited choice meant consumers had less control over their data use; and 
finally, it was plausible that competition concerns about market power and asymmetric 
information may exacerbate broader online harms. Key characteristics of the online 
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advertising market were network effects and economies of scale; consumers defaulted to 
recommended options to save time; unequal access to user data; lack of transparency; 
vertical integration and conflicts of interest. These could be mutually reinforcing and lead to 
‘substantial barriers to expansion’.  In the social media market in the previous decade there 
had only been a few new entrants and only Instagram was really successful – and the CMA 
wanted to know if that was because of its acquisition by Facebook. Facebook users largely 
don’t change their advertising settings so they are opted in to personalised ads by default. 
Facebook and Google’s tags on so many websites gave them a substantial competitive 
advantage on consumer behaviour tracking and was a barrier to entry. Decision-making by 
algorithm meant a lack of transparency and asymmetric information for market participants. 
News outlets had insufficient information on News Feed changes. Advertisers had 
inadequate information on advertising effectiveness, with no independent verification. 
Facebook had clear market power in respect of display advertising and the ability to exploit 
its market power. Facebook’s family of applications helped to protect it from competition. 
Vertical integration was a major issue, especially in the case of Google.  
The CMA found ‘that the profitability of both Google and Facebook has been well above any 
reasonable estimate of what we would expect in a competitive market for many years.’  This 
was evidence that was ‘consistent with the exploitation of market power.’ They also had 
exclusionary power and were able to leverage their operations into other markets. 
Competition could be assisted by a code of conduct applicable to Google and Facebook; 
transparency and data rules, including options to use services without advertising, opting in 
to advertisements rather than opting out; and fairness in design to avoid dark patterns 
which made finding privacy options hard. Facebook could be required to interoperate some 
features with competitors; its power to impose restrictions on competitors could be 
prevented and access to its previous API could be restored. It might be necessary to 
consider the break-up of Facebook and Instagram. Separation of business operations, 
sometimes called ring-fencing, could be an option. 
The CMA recognised that some antitrust issues, such as structural separation, which were 
being canvassed, required international action and was not open to the UK unilaterally. 
Google and Facebook presented ‘a truly global antitrust challenge facing governments and 
regulators.’ The CMA was cooperating with a wide range of competition authorities 
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internationally. The UK Government has now opened a consultation on online advertising 
(DCMS, 2020). Many commentators draw attention to how the platforms are making money 
from dubious advertising, such as ‘vaccine alternatives’, banned in other media (Rushton, 
2019). The ASA’s 2019-23 strategy document, More Impact Online, commits it to investing 
further in online regulation which it acknowledges is regarded by many as a ‘Wild West’ 
(ASA, 2018). 
Media sustainability  
A range of scholars have made the case persuasively that Facebook exhibits the same 
characteristics as a media company. Academics and policy advocates have argued that 
platforms like Facebook need to be incorporated into sector-specific legislation on media 
plurality and diversity, designed to support a healthy public sphere with diverse media 
sources, content and exposure. (Foster, 2012; Napoli and Caplan, 2017; Tambini and Labo, 
2014; Flew et al, 2019; Napoli, 2019b). Facebook has resisted such a definition, even though 
when announcing changes to the Facebook Newsfeed in 2013 Mark Zuckerberg said ‘What 
we're trying to do is give everyone in the world the best personalized newspaper we can’ 
(Kim, 2013). More recently, seeking to resist the California court case brought by the app-
maker Six4Three, Facebook lawyers said that the right to deny data to Six4Three and other 
developers was ‘a quintessential publisher function’ comparing this to the right of a 
newspaper (Levin, 2018). Facebook is now in the market for original video content, it 
supports a major Journalism project and shows sports in a number of international 
territories. More recently, it has produced a dedicated News Tab and aims to do more to 
direct traffic to publishers, (Brown, 2019). However, the News Feed algorithm has been 
regularly tweaked, reducing the number of news items in the News Feed (a useful summary 
can be found at Wallaroomedia.com, 2019). It is also hiring journalists (Ha, 2019).  
On a definitional basis, some argue (Rajan, 2016) that media companies create, post, curate, 
distribute and monetise content -  although in the UK, Channel Four, for example, has 
operated on a publisher-broadcaster model of publishing content produced by others. 
Facebook’s algorithm curates content, and it produces edited videos of users’ activity for 
them to post to their pages. As Gillespie (2018: 43) points out, Facebook’s decision to 
change the News Feed from a chronologically curated flow of information to an 
algorithmically-chosen selection was profitable for the platform, but that shift makes 
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Facebook more liable for the content that is made available, as it was producing ‘a media 
commodity’.  
Facebook’s  famous censorship of the naked young Vietnamese girl fleeing Napalm, which 
became the subject of a row with the editor of the Norwegian newspaper Aftenposten and 
the Norwegian Prime minister, its regular censorship of breast-feeding photographs, and 
breast cancer awareness programmes, naked statues, and many other examples, as well as 
deliberate actions to remove material offensive to governments around the world are all 
examples of an editorial role being played. The Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission (ACCC) has said platforms like Facebook ‘increasingly perform similar functions 
as news media businesses such as selecting, publishing and ranking content, including 
significant amounts of news media content’( ACCC, 2019).  
The question is however, what kind of remedies can be applied without attacking similar 
freedoms enjoyed by media companies. That is why Winseck (2019), Vaidhyanathan (2018), 
and others point to the importance of political economy and using regulatory principles 
drawn from, for example, telecommunications policy, to set the boundaries for regulatory 
policy in this field.  
Antitrust measures alone will not of course address the media deficit (Napoli, 2019b; 
Pickard, 2020). Facebook has disrupted the global media ecosystem and its dominance, and 
its practices, including adaptations to the News Feed algorithm, have helped to impose a 
dependency relationship upon the media sector as a whole (Andrews, 2019a). The UK’s 
Cairncross review examined how to create a sustainable future for journalism. There was a 
need to reset the ‘unbalanced’ relationship between news media organisations and news 
aggregating platforms, with new codes of conduct overseen by a regulator. Cairncross’s 
conclusions are reinforced by academic research and industry surveys.  
The review asked whether the media market is a fair one, or has growth of big online 
platforms – especially Google and Facebook – created distortions that justify govt 
intervention, noting the platform dominance of advertising and its essential control of 
access to news.  The impact had been particularly strong in the area of public interest news: 
‘activities which are important public goods, essential to the preservation of an accountable 
democracy, with poor incentives for supply (and limited demand)’. Cairncross noted the 
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drive to more clickbait in news formats, seeking to grab attention, and the impact that this 
had on the kind of news being reported or supported. Facebook explicitly was emerging as a 
competitor for local news organisations as Facebook Groups came to provide forms of local 
community information, albeit not independently corroborated or effectively resourced. As 
well as new funding sources for public interest news in the form of public subsidies, 
Cairncross identified the platform role in online advertising as requiring investigation by the 
CMA.  
The review made a number of suggestions aimed at addressing the platform/publisher 
imbalance. These included a new code of conduct to rebalance the relationship. This would 
govern commercial relationships, and would be overseen by a regulator with power to insist 
on compliance – there could be minimum requirements. The regulator would need a full set 
of powers to command information; there should be a news quality obligation on platforms 
under regulatory supervision, with a reporting requirement initially; and there should be 
investment in media literacy. Cairncross’s issues with regard to platform power have now 
largely been overtaken by the CMA inquiry. The Stigler review (2019) suggested that the 
Section 230 privileges granted in US law to the platforms operated as a form of subsidy not 
available to media organisations which were liable for content on their platforms, and 
arguably this principle might be applied to EU law also.  
 
 
Taxation of the Digital Economy 
Mark Zuckerberg appears resigned to Facebook paying more tax (Facebook, 2020). Pressure 
groups have identified that Facebook shifts profits into tax havens (Taxwatch, 2019). 
Estimates of the loss of Facebook and Google taxes within the EU amount Range between 
one and five billion euros from 2013-15 alone (Tang and Bussink, 2017). Facebook has 
previously had to adjust its figures for where 2015 revenues had been obtained (Facebook, 
2017). It faces a challenge from the Inland Revenue Service over its Dublin tax arrangements 
(White, 2020).  
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In the UK, a series of Treasury documents have paved the way for the Digital Services Tax 
which is intended to be levied from the 2020-21 Financial Year. The Treasury argued in 
Corporate Taxation and the Digital Economy: position paper (HMT, 2017) that multinational 
profits should be taxed in the countries where they generated value. The Treasury had 
worked with the OECD on various initiatives to address this (see, for example, OECD, 2017). 
International corporate taxation rules must recognise the digital economy and ensure that 
for the large digital companies ‘their UK corporate tax payments are commensurate with 
the value they generate from the UK market and specifically the participation of UK users’. 
Prior to this, the former Chancellor George Osborne had announced a tax deal with Google 
in 2016 whereby it paid £130 million as a settlement, having previously paid no tax (Kwong, 
2016).  
The document confirmed that the UK would press for reforms to the international taxation 
framework and explore interim options such as a tax on UK revenues. Echoing statements 
by Chancellor Philip Hammond in his Budget Speech (2017), the document said that the UK 
would take action against multinational groups especially in the digital sector ‘who achieve 
low-tax outcomes by holding their valuable intangible assets such as intellectual property in 
low-tax countries where they have limited economic substance.’ 
In March 2018, the Treasury published an update (HMT, 2018a) reinforcing the message 
that the tax system had not kept pace with changes, following feedback from stakeholders. 
It noted that user participation and engagement were an important aspect of digital value 
creation. The Government’s preference remained for international tax reform through the 
OECD, but in the absence of that it would consider interim measures such as revenue-based 
taxes. 
Prior to the Furman Expert Panel, the Treasury published The Economic Value of Data (HMT, 
2018b), which noted the significant growth in data produced since 2015 and its likely future 
growth, not least through the development of the ‘Internet of Things’, with much of the 
data being collected ‘exhaust’ data - the by-products of other uses – and unstructured data. 
Data was ‘an unexploited asset’ whose value may not be recognised. That value was both 
economic and social. It used the example of data being used to assist transport planning in 
London as an example of the data being used to improve public wellbeing. The development 
of artificial intelligence, and the need to plan for that, as the AI Review had demonstrated 
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(Hall and Pesenti, 2017) and the use of algorithms, which the new Centre for Data Ethics and 
Innovation was examining, and issues of copyright, were other factors which had to be 
considered, as well as Data Protection, with the 2018 Data Protection Act and the GDPR at 
the core of that. There were challenges in the use of public data. Interoperability and 
standards needed to be mandated: the examples were given of the CMA in ensuring Open 
Banking and the powers that government had taken in the Bus Services Act over private 
sector bus data. The DBEIS Green Paper on Modernising Consumer Markets had also 
promised a Smart Data review. Data need to be protected through anonymisation and 
depersonalization. Putting the UK at the forefront in AI and data was reflected in actions 
such as the AI Sector deal (BEIS, 2018b), the Digital Charter (DCMS, 2018) and the Digital 
Strategy (2017b); 1000 new PhDs in AI were planned. 
The Chancellor confirmed plans for a digital services tax in his November 2018 budget and 
alongside that the Treasury published the Digital Services Tax: Consultation document 
(HMT,2018c). The document said that the international taxation framework was failing to 
take account of a new source of value creation – ‘certain highly-digitalised business models 
that derive value from the participation of their users’. While the OECD process was key, 
until that concluded there was a need for interim measures, specifically a tax on certain 
business practices. The Digital Services Tax would be a narrowly-targeted tax on the UK 
revenues of digital businesses ‘that are considered to derive significant value from the 
participation of their users’. It would apply from April 2020. The businesses targeted are 
very clearly online platforms such as Google, Facebook, Apple and Amazon: businesses in 
scope were social media platforms, search engines or online marketplaces who derived 
globally more than £500 million in revenues for these services and generated more than £25 
million for these services from UK user participation. User participation was defined as 
content generation, depth of engagement, network effects and externalities, and 
contribution to brand. Detailed definitions were given of the meanings of social media 
platforms, search engines and online marketplaces – deeper, indeed, than the Digital 
Economy Act. The tax was estimated to raise £5million in 2019-20; £275 million in 2020-1, 
rising to £440 million by 2023-4. These revenue figures were revised upwards in the 2020 
UK Budget (HMT, 2020) which confirmed that the Tax would go ahead pending international 
agreement. Draft legislation and guidance  was published in 2019 (HMT, 2019a and b).  
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Age-appropriate services and design 
In January 2020 the ICO published its final version of the Age Appropriate Design Code. It 
was estimated that 20% of internet users were children. The Information Commissioner said 
that ‘in a generation from now, we will look back and find it astonishing that online services 
weren’t always designed with children in mind.’ The code set down standards which would 
affect a range of services from social media platforms to connected toys. It requires digital 
services to provide children automatically with ‘a built-in baseline of data protection’ 
whenever they download an app or game or visit a website. It draws on standards from 
GDPR and the 2018 Data Protection Act and following a 12-month ‘grace period’ is likely to 
come into effect by autumn 2021 (ICO, 2020).  
  
Algorithmic accountability and transparency 
The UK government asked the new Centre for Data Ethics and Innovation to consider the 
issue of online targeting. The CDEI made three sets of recommendations: 
• online harms regulation should ensure that companies that operate online 
targeting systems are held to higher standards of accountability 
• operation of online targeting should be made more transparent to enable 
social understanding of these systems 
• people should be given greater control over the way they are targeted 
The report (CDEI, 2020) said online targeting systems too often operate without sufficient 
transparency and accountability, falling short of the OECD’s human-centred principles on AI. 
The CDEI noted that online targeting ‘has been blamed for a number of harms’ including the 
erosion of autonomy and exploitation of people’s vulnerabilities such as mental health, the 
undermining of democracy and society including radicalisation and polarisation and 
increased discrimination.  
The CDEI specifically focused on personalised advertising and content recommendation 
systems. Online targeting, it said, was ‘at the core of the online business model’: 
 45 
 
Recommendation systems encourage users to spend more time on these platforms. 
This leads to the collection of more data, increases the effectiveness of the 
recommendations and of the platforms’ personalised advertising products, and 
makes them more attractive to advertisers. 
Every action a user took enabled the platforms to extract more data. The CDEI said that 
online targeting systems should not be designed to maximise user engagement. 
 
Online targeting had put ‘a handful of global online platform businesses in positions of 
enormous power to predict and influence behaviour.’ They had ‘significant social and 
political power’. Their power derived from observing users’ behaviour, influencing 
perception through the flow of information, prediction and influence, and control of 
expression. Other actors could exploit that power, including terrorist groups and hostile 
state actors. The CDEI said that existing regulators’ powers and self-regulation were 
inadequate to deal with this. The public did not want targeting stopped but they did want 
high standards of accountability and transparency, and meaningful control over how they 
were targeted. Online targeting presented specific regulatory challenges: by its nature, it is 
not transparent to users or regulators unlike broadcast content, and online platforms are 
international businesses, with Google and Facebook specifically named as being in scope. 
There were specific problems of self-regulation, namely information asymmetry, platform 
control of rules, and incentives that are aligned with reputation management not public 
policy goals. 
Democratic governments had a legitimate interest in how these platforms operated. The 
new regulatory regime should be developed to promote responsibility and transparency and 
safeguard human rights by design. The new online harms regulator should strengthen 
oversight of targeting, working alongside the ICO, taking a ‘systemic’ approach. The online 
harms regulator should have a statutory duty to protect and respect freedom of expression 
and privacy. The regulator would need information gathering powers and ‘should have the 
power to require platforms to give independent experts secure access to their data to 
enable further testing of compliance with the code’ using these powers proportionately and 
with a duty to protect privacy and commercial confidentiality. Platforms should be required 
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to maintain online archives ‘of personalised advertising that pose particular societal risks’, 
such as jobs, credit and housing, age-restricted products, and political advertising. There 
should be ‘formal coordination mechanisms between the online harms regulator, the ICO 
and the CMA, and effective operational coordination between other regulators. Regulators 
had recognised the need to recruit data science experts, and the FCA, with its RegTech and 
Advanced Analytics department, might be ‘an important partner for other regulators as they 
develop their data capability’. Regulators should coordinate digital literacy campaigns. 
Governments should support the development of ‘data intermediaries’ which could 
rebalance power towards users. The CDEI endorses the CMA’s ‘fairness by design’ 
proposals.  
Electronic currencies and the stability of the financial system 
Facebook formally announced its plans for the Libra ‘stablecoin’ cryptocurrency in June 
2019 with 27 other companies (Facebook, 2019; Libra, 2019), to be run by its new Calibra 
subsidiary,  following months of speculation. Facebook positioned its idea in the rhetoric of 
global altruism: 
For many people around the world, even basic financial services are still out of 
reach: almost half of the adults in the world don’t have an active bank account and 
those numbers are worse in developing countries and even worse for women. The 
cost of that exclusion is high — approximately 70% of small businesses in developing 
countries lack access to credit and $25 billion is lost by migrants every year through 
remittance fees. 
Immediately, concerns were raised about its potential uses and its potential threats to the 
banking, stock market and currency systems. The company faced scrutiny in Congress 
(House of Representatives, 2019) and from EU regulators (Chee, 2019). Zuckerberg admitted 
in evidence he gave to the committee that Facebook wasn’t in a good place to be trusted to 
launch such a new service: 
I understand we’re not the ideal messenger right now. We’ve faced a lot of issues 
over the past few years, and I’m sure people wish it was anyone but Facebook 
putting this idea forward.  
Libra marks Zuckerberg’s next stage plan for the development of Facebook, which includes 
building a private e-commerce business on the WhatsApp platform, using the Chinese app 
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Wechat as its basic model. Facebook is testing payments on WhatsApp in India, as 
Zuckerberg told analysts on the company’s October 2019 earnings call (Facebook, 2019g). It 
is also consolidating its payment features into a single product to be called Facebook Pay 
(Thompson 2019c)  
In the UK context, the Bank of England has oversight of these issues, although Facebook’s 
ability to move into this market is a direct result of the power it has to leverage into other 
markets, identified by Furman and the CMA. Bank of England Governor Mark Carney set out 
his view in a speech at Jackson Hole in August 2019: 
the relatively high costs of domestic and cross border electronic payments are 
encouraging innovation, with new entrants applying new technologies to offer lower 
cost, more convenient retail payment services.  
The most high profile of these has been Libra – a new payments infrastructure based 
on an international stablecoin fully backed by reserve assets in a basket of currencies 
including the US dollar, the euro, and sterling. It could be exchanged between users 
on messaging platforms and with participating retailers.  
He noted that there were a host of fundamental issues that Libra must address, ranging 
from privacy to money laundering and finance of terrorism and operational resilience. 
Noting that ‘it could have substantial implications for both monetary and financial stability’, 
he laid down a warning that touched on the failures of social media regulation to date:  
The Bank of England and other regulators have been clear that unlike in social media, 
for which standards and regulations are only now being developed after the 
technologies have been adopted by billions of users, the terms of engagement for 
any new systemic private payments system must be in force well in advance of any 
launch (Carney, 2019).  
Since then, a number of the founding partners have left the project, including PayPal, 
Mastercard eBay and Visa (Brandom, 2019). EU Finance Ministers have agreed that no 
stablecoin currency should launch in the EU until key legal, regulatory and oversight issues 
have been resolved (Valero, 2019). 
Regulatory coordination 
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The UK Government’s Consumer Markets Green Paper said that regulators should prevent 
harm, without stifling innovation, and work together through the UK Regulators’ Network.  
Current and future digital and data challenges ‘require the government and regulators to 
work together, while respecting regulators’ independence’. Coordination needed to be 
strengthened. Better cross-cutting work was needed. A joint government-regulator 
Consumer Forum would be created, chaired by the Minister for Consumer Affairs.  
It is striking how many of the documents reviewed emphasise the need for regulatory 
coordination. This is a sign of the wide-ranging nature of Facebook and Google’s operations, 
their market power and their functional sovereignty. The importance of regulatory 
coordination has also been stressed by a number of independent reports and by academics 
(LSE, 2018; Tambini, 2019). The CDEI report says regulators should develop formal 
coordination mechanisms and reinforces the need for regulatory coordination and 
coherence, suggesting that the FCA’s long-standing work in the area of algorithms could be 
of practical relevance.  
The documents also identify some potential tensions between different policy ambitions, 
for example in respect of the interaction of competition policy and data protection, 
identified by Furman, the CMA and the CDEI, as well as regulatory overlaps mentioned by 
the CDEI. 
The regulators emphasise the ways in which they are cooperating and coordinating their 
activities both domestically and internationally. Domestically, OFCOM says that it has a joint 
programme of work with the ICO. Its report on economic harms makes reference to Furman 
and Cairncross and the Behavioural Insights Team amongst others and confirms that it is 
working closely with the ICO and the CMA ‘sharing expertise on communications services, 
ex-ante competition regulation and data privacy.’ Ofcom’s (2019a) consumer research n 
attitudes to internet use refers to advice on research and design from the ICO. The ICO 
refers to advice from Ofcom.  The CMA is discussing the interaction of competition and data 
protection policy issues with the ICO. Its report on online advertising draws on material 
from Ofcom and the ICO. The UK’s concurrency framework (CMA, 2019b) governs the ways 
in which the CMA and sectoral regulators decide who will take the lead on specific 
investigations where they have concurrent powers.  The CDEI identified eight regulators 
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with interests in the field of micro-targeting. The ICO and Electoral Commission and Cabinet 
Office had contact over the range of issues being considered in the context of Cambridge 
Analytica, and the ICO also worked with the National Crime Agency over this and took 
advice from the Insolvency Service and FCA. They had also worked with the BBFC, the ASA 
and the National Cyber Security Centre (Denham, 2018).  
Internationally, there has been significant cooperation. Over Cambridge Analytica, the ICO 
made referrals to international law enforcement agencies including the FBI (International 
Grand Committee, 2018), and worked with its counterparts in the USA such as the FTC (see 
FTC, 2020) and Canada’s Privacy Commissioner (See McEvoy, 2019), as well as the Irish DPC 
as the lead EU data protection authority for Facebook (a complaint has been filed with the 
EU as to whether the DPC is properly resourced: Kobie, 2020). The CMA is in discussion with 
7 other competition authorities internationally and its report draws on material from the 
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission and the Stigler Commission in the US. 
Ofcom’s work on market failures and harms draws on Furman, Stigler and the EU expert 
panel.  
 
Brexit, Trade Policy and the threat to platform regulation 
It is clear that the UK has been developing a significant suite of regulatory proposals over 
the last three years in respect of the major social media and search platforms which 
increasingly focus on the ways in which their business models contribute to the generation 
of online, social and economic harms. This has seen the resurgence of political economy as a 
key element. However, regulatory proposals which have a specific impact on Big Tech 
companies headquartered in the United States acquire a particular relevance to the 
geopolitical necessity for the UK in securing a trade deal with the United States following 
the U.K.’s departure from the European Union. 
The United States sees technology regulation and taxation as discrimination against its 
domestic companies. This is a bipartisan theme in the United States. Facebook and others 
have effectively exploited trade treaty negotiations to dilute legislative threats 
internationally. They have made sure that ‘platform liability’ - holding the Big Tech 
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companies accountable for what happens on their sites - is a trade issue for the United 
States. The United States Trade Representative recently saluted the new trade agreement 
with Canada and Mexico which includes a clause to “limit the civil liability of Internet 
platforms for third-party content that such platforms host or process, outside of the realm 
of intellectual property enforcement, thereby enhancing the economic viability of these 
engines of growth that depend on user interaction and user content”.  
There have been suggestions that the Government is set to water down its online harm 
proposals (Swinford et al, 2020). When the UK Government published its negotiating 
position for a trade deal with the United States, former chair of the House of Commons 
DCMS Select Committee, Damian Collins, asked the Secretary of State for International 
Trade whether the UK Government would prevent such a clause being inserted in the 
agreement as that would prevent action against Online Harms. The Secretary of State told 
him that the UK stood by its Online Harms proposals and the US Trade Agreement would 
not affect that (Collins, 2020).  
In the United States, libertarian think-tanks like the American Enterprise Institute have said 
that the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation represent trade tariffs or barriers by other 
means, and data deals should be incorporated in trade talks. The Prime Minister said that 
the UK would develop independent policies on data protection, suggesting a possible 
departure from GDPR (Hansard, 2020). Data provisions are a major issue for the EU (Council 
for the European Union, 2020). 
The UK has already said it will not implement the EU copyright directive (BBC 2020d). Its 
position on the e-Privacy directive, which could also have a significant impact on Facebook 
and Google’s ability to leverage data in advertising (DCN, 2017) is unclear.  Free market 
think-tanks in the USA have articulated issues that will require negotiation with the UK 
(Barfield, 2020). US lawmakers have warned the UK that a trade deal would be unlikely if 
the digital taxation proposals went ahead, and the then Chancellor was confronted on this 
at Davos by the US Treasury Chief (Reid, 2020) . Although Boris Johnson has spoken of unfair 
competition from untaxed Big Tech companies (Swinford and Jones, 2019), the desperation 
for a deal might be too much post-Brexit (Woodcock, 2019). Within US politics, this isn’t 
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necessarily just a Republican issue: in the past, Barack Obama attacked EU action against 
the major platforms as protectionist (Farrell, 2015).  
 
Conclusion 
This has been called ‘a regulatory challenge on a scale not seen since the early debates over 
nuclear weapons’ (Jenkins, 2019). The scale of scrutiny for regulators is huge, as the ICO’s 
evidence of seizure of hundreds of terabytes of data indicates (ICO, 2018a, b, c). Platform 
transience (Barrett and Kreiss, 2019) is fast paced, as spelt out in Facebook’s slogan ‘Move 
fast and Break Things’ (SEC, 2012). Platforms have been granted the freedom to leverage 
their operations into other markets, extending horizontally and excluding others, as the 
CMA (2019) notes. At the same time, their vertical integration affords them advantages and 
it is too soon to say whether legislation such as GDPR is able to unpick this, as Furman 
(2019) and the CMA have identified. There still remain several open cases against Facebook 
companies, the Irish DPC (2020) recently confirmed. Platform power is underpinned by 
complex interactions in policy, as Ofcom (2019) has noted.  
But what the empirical research shows is that the U.K. has developed a level of regulatory 
expertise over the last three years which has identified the bulk of challenges caused by 
platforms such as Facebook and Google. That regulatory expertise has also identified 
potential solutions, many of which fall into the category of political economy, and which do 
not receive as much attention as actions to address online harms. For many of us the 
actions identified may fall short of what we would like to see, and the urgency of 
implementation may be lagging. But nevertheless, there is a suite of options open to 
regulators and lawmakers. Political understanding of the issues of the issues is also growing 
as academic reseachers such as Kate Klonick have observed (Greene, 2019).     
These are international challenges, but regulators are co-operating in unprecedented ways 
(ICO, 2018a, b,c; CMA, 2019), developing a shared analysis. Although the focus here is on 
the U.K., many of the issues identified and approaches taken apply also to the USA, 
Australia, Canada,  Germany, France, Italy and the EU in general.  
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For many, Facebook dominance drives the agenda, along with a growing distrust of 
Facebook’s seriousness about these issues, no matter the avowed commitment of its senior 
figures. Facebook now commands little confidence, because it has been found wanting 
before, and because its decisions have appeared inconsistent, contradictory, capricious, and 
compromised by the profit motive (Channel Four, 2018; Cohen, 2019). Legislative and 
regulatory frustration with Facebook and other platforms has turned to the question of 
criminal penalties on the senior managements of platform companies (DCMS, 2019; FTC, 
2019). If company founders want outright company control under the U.S.A.’s generous 
ownership models, and corporate governance is failing, then personal responsibility may 
have to be reinforced with stringent personal legal obligations for company behaviour. 
There will not be a Google Act or a Facebook Act, and we are clearly some way from a 
Digital Platform Act (Feld, 2019). Instead, this is an unfolding process of regulation, in which 
users, civic society, media pressure, political inquiries, regulatory rules, actions and 
pressures, legislative action by governments and probably litigation will all play their part. 
So will shock, moral outrage and indignation. But regulators are getting savvier about their 
definitions of the platforms, with a real focus now on advertising-funded platforms (CMA, 
2019) and a clear understanding of the categories of social media, search and online 
marketplace (HMT, 2018c).  
There are obvious limitations to this paper. Its focus is the U.K. It has principally been 
produced through documentary analysis. It would be valuable to supplement this with elite 
interviews with senior people in the regulatory bodies and government departments, as 
well as political figures, to understand more about the developing sense-making process 
and the level of regulatory co-operation domestically and internationally, as well as the 
push-back from those whose companies are the targets of regulation. The valuable work 
done by the University of Wisconsin’s Zuckerberg Files project in documenting the twists 
and turns of the Facebook narrative could perhaps be supplemented by a specific focus on 
Facebook regulatory and legislative submissions across different jurisdictions. This would be 
a valuable project for researchers to collaborate upon internationally. 
It is interesting to see how regulators are unwilling to allow Facebook to disrupt the 
international finance system with its Libra project (Carney, 2019; Knowles, 2019). If only the 
same pre-emptive vigilance had been paid to our democratic system.  
 53 
 
The Coronavirus crisis has been an opportunity for Facebook and other ‘Big Tech’ companies 
to demonstrate their value to the wider community. New Facebook groups have been set 
up as people share enthusiasms, organise volunteer activities, coordinate business 
deliveries, raise funds for health and social care projects, hold online activities including 
religious services, and many others. The company has donated substantial sums to small 
businesses and made use of its data-gathering to help track population behaviour in the 
pandemic, and developed its own symptom tracker (Newton, 2020b, c and d; Wong, 2020; 
Zuckerberg, 2020) Facebook has sought to demonstrate how it can block misinformation 
and disinformation about COVID-19, including anti-quarantine pages (Ghaffary, 2020). This 
has had a degree of success, though it has not been one hundred per cent effective (Avaaz, 
2020; Fortson, 2020) – but the success has simply drawn attention to Facebook’s failure to 
do this on other issues (Wagner and Frier, 2020). Although the libertarian right suggests that 
this has demonstrated the effectiveness of self-regulation (Pethokoukis, 2020), there are 
signs that governments and regulators have not pulled back from their regulatory initiatives 
(CPI, 2020a and b; Pedigo, 2020; Washington State, 2020), with Australia forcing them to 
share revenue with media companies (Taylor, 2020), similar pressure now in the UK (Moore, 
2020; The Times, 2020), Germany proposing to amend its competition law in respect of 
market-tipping (Weck, 2020), and Denmark taking action against dark patterns in privacy 
consent pop-ups (Kjaer, 2020). Facebook’s Libra project appears to have been scaled back in 
the face of regulatory concerns (Stacey and Murphy, 2020). Scrutiny will continue in the run-
up to the 2020 US Presidential election (Bogost and Madrigal, 2020), but Facebook and 
others are using the current crisis to lobby against initiatives such as the U.K.’s Digital 
Services Tax (Aldrick and Hurley, 2020). Prior to the crisis, however, Zuckerberg’s trip to 
Brussels with Facebook’s own regulatory proposals (Egan, 2019; Bickert, 2020) does not 
appear to have cut much ice with EU regulators (Knowles, 2020a). 
However, Facebook is not unregulated: it is under-regulated. Regulation, as we have seen, is 
a process, not a text. To borrow a phrase from Facebook’s early days, done is better than 
perfect. The struggle continues – we take our victories where we can. 
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